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California Supreme Court Survey
May 1995 - August 1996
The California Supreme Court Survey provides a brief synopsis of recent
decisions by the supreme court. The purpose of the survey is to inform the read-
er of issues that the supreme court has addressed, as well as to serve as a start-
ing point for researching any of the topical areas. Attorney discipline, judicial
misconduct, and death penalty appeal cases have been omitted from the survey.
The survey will review California Supreme Court cases in either an article or
summary format. Articles provide an in-depth analysis of selected California
Supreme Court cases including the potential impact a case may have on Califor-
nia law. Additionally, articles guide the reader to secondary sources that focus
on specific points of law.
Summaries provide a brief outline of the areas of law addressed in selected
California Supreme Court cases. Summaries are designed to provide the reader
with a basic understanding of the legal implications of cases in a concise for-
mat
ARTICLES
I. APPELLATE REVIEW
A statute making a petition for extraordinary writ the
exclusive mode of appellate review for claims brought un-
der the California Public Records Act does not violate the
appellate jurisdiction provision of the California Consti-
tution:
Powers v. City of Richmond ..................... 1403
11. CRMINAL LAW
A. A jury's deadlock on a greater offense of gross vehicular
manslaughter followed by a conviction on the lesser in-
cluded offense of vehicular manslaughter bars subsequent
prosecution of the greater offense pursuant to the double
jeopardy statute, Penal Code section 1023:
People v. Fields ............................... 1409
1397
B. A murder victim's statements to her daughter that she
was going to another city with the defendant and that
daughter should call her aunt if victim did not return
were admissible into evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule. Also, there may be a special circumstance
to impose the death penalty where the murder victim
was not an eyewitness to the defendant's prior crime:
People v. Jones. ............................. 1416
C. Judges have the power to strike prior felony convictions
in furtherance of justice in three strike cases:
People v. Romero ............................ 1421
I. DEEDS
A deed to a railroad company that purported to convey a
'Wght of way" actually conveyed a fee interest and not
an easement; this determination was fact-specific, and
the court examined extrinsic evidence to illuminate the
parties' intent:
City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court ........ 1429
IV. DELINQUENT, DEPENDENT AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
A juvenile court, when terminating its dependency juris-
diction, may issue an order conditioning visitation on a
parent's participation in counseling to minimize poten-
tial dangers of the same risk of physical abuse or emo-
tional harm that previously led to the dependency adju-
dication. In doing so, the juvenile court is not bound by
the requirements of Family Code section 3190:
In re Chantal S............................... 1436
V. EQUAL PROTECTION
A cause of action exists under former § 1513(d) of the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 when un-
equal treatment under California's facially impartial tax
laws is alleged:
American Airlines, Inc. v. San Mateo County ....... 1442
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VI. JUVENILE COURT LAW
Anders v. California, which requires compliance with
certain procedures before a court will permit appointed
counsel to withdraw from a case, is not applicable to an
indigent parent's appeal from judgment affecting the
custody of a child or terminating parental rights:
In re Sade C ................................ 1448
VII. PuBuc WELFARE AND UTLrrIEs
Causes of action for personal injury, trespass, nuisance,
inverse condemnation, negligence and violation of due
process rights in connection with alleged injuries caused
by electric and magnetic field (EMF) emissions fail
when they interfere with the regulatory commission's
policy on EMF emissions and public health and safety:
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court. ... 1458
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SUMMARIES
I. Criminal Law
A. A criminal defendant may not challenge a prior
conviction on the ground of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in the course of a current pros-
ecution for a noncapital offense.
Garcia v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided January 9, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 953,
928 P.2d 572, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858 ............. 1465
B. California Welfare and Institutions Code section
702 requires that in a juvenile adjudication,
where the defendant has committed a crime
which would be punishable in an adult proceed-
ing as either a misdemeanor or a felony, the
trial court must expressly state in the record
that the violation is a misdemeanor or felony.
In re Manzy, Supreme Court of California, Decided
February 20, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1199, 930 P.2d
1255, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889 ................... 1466
C. Where a trial court has made a fact-specific
inquiry in its discretionary decision pursuant to
California Penal Code section 17(b) to reduce a
wobbler offense initially filed under the three
strikes law from a felony to a misdemeanor,
such exercise of authority is not an abuse of
discretion.
People v. Alvarez, Supreme Court of California,
Decided January 16, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 928
P.2d 1171, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93................ 1467
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D. Transferred intent can be used to satisfy the
intent element for more than one crime, thus,
allowing the defendant to be found guilty of
murder of the unintended victim and attempted
murder of the intended victim.
People v. Scott, Supreme Court of California, De-
cided December 19, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 544, 927 P.2d
288, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 .................... 1469
I. Fraud and Deceit
When a person writes a letter of recommenda-
tion, that person owes a duty of due care to
third persons to not misrepresent facts regard-
ing an individual's qualifications or character if
such misrepresentations could reasonably and
foreseeably cause physical injury to a third per-
son.
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District,
Supreme Court of California, Decided January 27,
1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 929 P.2d 582, 60 Cal. Rptr.
2d 263 ................................. 1470
III. Insurance
California Public Utilities Code section 24361,
the provision of California's version of the Uni-
form Aircraft Financial Responsibility Act
(CUAFRA) that prohibits the cancellation of any
aircraft liability insurance policy meeting the
requirements of CUAFRA unless thirty days
prior notice is given to the Department of
Transportation, applies only to policies that
have been filed with the Department of Trans-
portation after an accident in satisfaction of
CUAFRA's financial responsibility requirements.
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To the extent that it protects tobacco companies
from direct liability for harm caused by smoking,
California Civil Code section 1714.45 also pre-
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non-economic damages payable under Propo-
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I. APPELLATE REVIEW
A statute making a petition for extraordinary Writ the
exclusive mode of appellate review for claims brought un-
der the California Public Records Act does not violate the
appellate jurisdiction provision of the California Consti-
tution: Powers v. City of Richmond.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Powers v. City of Richmond,' the California Supreme Court con-
sidered whether California Government Code section 6259(c), providing
that petitions for extraordinary writ are the exclusive means of review
for superior court actions seeking disclosure of documents under the
Public Records Act (PRA), violates article VI, section 11 of the California
Constitution which states that, with the exception of death penalty cases,
a court of appeal has "appellate jurisdiction" over all superior court ac-
tions within its original jurisdiction.2 The trial court entered judgment
for the City of Richmond (Richmond), denying Powers' request to com-
pel Richmond to prepare and release a computer generated report con-
1. 10 Cal. 4th 85, 893 P.2d 1160, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 839 (1995). Justice Kennard deliv-
ered the majority opinion in which Justices Baxter and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 89-
115, 893 P.2d at 1161-78, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-57. Chief Justice George wrote a con-
curring opinion, joined by Retired Associate Justice Arabian. Id. at 115-24, 893 P.2d at
1178-84, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-63 (George, C.J., concurring). Justice Lucas wrote a
dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Mosk. Id. at 124-83, 893 P.2d at 1184-1224, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 863-903 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 89-90, 893 P.2d at 1161, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. Powers, a candidate for
city council, requested the City of Richmond to disclose the expenditures of the mayor,
city council, and city manager for the second half of fiscal year 1990-91. Id. at 90, 893
P.2d at 1161, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840. Upon receipt of the specific information in a
computer generated report, Powers requested the same information for the first half of
fiscal year 1990-91. Id. Instead of providing Powers with the specific information, the
City of Richmond gave Powers access to a check register which contained intermingled
information with other departments and agencies. Id.; see CAL Gov'T CODE § 6259(c)
(West 1995) (describing the mode of appellate review for PRA actions); CAL. CONST. art
VI, § 11 (discussing the application of appellate jurisdiction). See generally 76 C.J.S.
Records § 122 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (explaining that an action may be brought in viola-
tion of a state statute for disclosure of records); Edward M. Schaffer et al., A Look at
the California Records Act and its Exemptions, 4 GOLDEN GATE U. L REv. 203 (1973)
(surveying the California Public Records Act as a response to the Federal Freedom of
Information Act of 1967).
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taining specific expenditure information for the beginning of fiscal year
1990-91. 3
The court of appeal denied Powers' petition for a writ of mandate
without a hearing or issuance of a written opinion.4 Further, the court of
appeal granted Richmond's motion to dismiss Powers' direct appeal as
barred under section 6259(c), reasoning that the appellate jurisdiction
provision of the California Constitution does not deprive the legislature
from specifying alternative forms of appellate review in PRA cases, spe-
cifically petitions for extraordinary writ in lieu of direct~appeals.5
The California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal's dismissal,
holding that the legislature's requirement for a petition for extraordinary
writ as the exclusive mode of appellate review in PRA cases is consti-
tutional. The court found that neither the language of article VI of the
California Constitution nor extrinsic evidence confer a right of direct
appeal on a litigant when a superior court is exercising original jurisdic-
tion.7 The court stated that the legislature is afforded considerable dis-
cretion in devising appellate procedures so long as the constitutional
right of appeal is not substantially impaired!
II. TREATMENTr
A. Majority Opinion
The court began its analysis by considering the legislative intent be-
hind the appellate jurisdiction language of the California Constitution.'
Giving the wordsotheir ordinary meaning, 9 the court stated that appel-
late jurisdiction refers to the exercise of a reviewing court's power to
review errors in trial court proceedings." The court found no intention
3. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 90, 893 P.2d at 1161, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 90-91, 893 P.2d at 1161-62, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 840-41.
6. Id. at 115, 893 P.2d at 1178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
7. Id. at 95, 893 P.2d at 1164, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 843.
8. Id. at 110, 893 P.2d at 1174, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 853. See generally 52 AM. JuR.
2D Mandamus § 316 (1970 & Supp. 1993) (explaining the availability of extraordinary
writs if expressly provided by statute); J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California
Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS LJ. 433, 439-40 (1994) (discussing the inclusion of ex-
traordinary writs as a method of appellate jurisdiction).
9. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 91, 893 P.2d at 1162, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 841.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 93, 893 P.2d at 1163, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842. See generally 4 CAL Jun. 3D
Appellate Review § 63 (1973) (discussing the modes of appellate review); 2 B.E.
WrTxIN, CALFORNIA PROCEDURE 3D, Courts § 254 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (summarizing re-
viewing courts and appellate proceedings); Roy A. Gustafson, Some Observations About
California Courts of Appeal, 19 UCLA L REv. 167, 167-83 (1971) (tracing the devel-
1404
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to confer on litigants an implied right of direct appeal in all cases within
the original jurisdiction of the superior courts. 2
Although the court found no ambiguity in the text of the constitution,
the court proceeded to examine extrinsic evidence to interpret article VI,
section 11."3 Specifically, the court reviewed the 1966 Constitutional Re-
vision to section 11 which deleted redundant, obsolete or unnecessary
provisions for matters capable of being prescribed by statute.4 The
court reasoned that the broad scope of legislative control over judicial
procedures, the lack of reference to any right of appeal, and the lack of
case law expressly limiting appellate jurisdiction to a right of direct ap-
peal is evidence that the judicial construction of the revision did not
intend to invoke a right to direct appeal." The court further reviewed
the entire evolution of article VI, section 11 as well as various court deci-
sions construing the evolving provisions'. and found the right of appeal
discussions inclusive of all forms of appellate review, including review by
petition of extraordinary writ. 7 The court concluded that the legislature
may regulate the mode of appellate review so long as one's constitutional
right of appeal is not substantially impaired by such regulation. 8 Thus,
the court's analysis of section l's development supported its determi-
nation that the appellate jurisdiction provision conferred no right to di-
rect appeal onto litigants.'9
Finally, the court considered whether the legislature's application of
extraordinary writ review in PRA cases impaired judicial power.' The
opment and binding effect of California courts of appeal).
12. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 93, 893 P.2d at 1163, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 93-94, 893 P.2d at 1163-64, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842-43. See generally 2 B.E.
WnKIN, CALIFORNIA PRocEDUmm 3D, Courts § 258 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (explaining the
Constitutional Revision of 1966); 8 B.E. WrTmN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 3D, Extraordi-
nary Writs § 5 (1985) (describing the 1966 revision's broadening effect on the consti-
tutional language to include extraordinary writs).
15. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 95, 108-09, 893 P.2d at 1164, 1173-74, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
843, 852-53.
16. Id at 95-108, 893 P.2d at 1165-74, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 844-53.
17. Id. at 97, 100, 893 P.2d at 1166, 1168, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 845, 847. See generally
2 B.E. WnrN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE 3D, Courts § 265 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the permissibility of appellate review by extraordinary writ).
18. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 98-99, 103, 110, 893 P.2d at 1166-67, 1169-70, 1174, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 845-46, 848-49, 853.
19. Id. at 105-06, 893 P.2d at 1171-72, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 850-51.
20. Id. at 110, 893 P.2d at 1175, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854.
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court concluded that the purpose of the legislature's substitution of writ
review was to speed appellate review, thereby allowing courts to quickly
rule on substantive issues which are of public importance and demand
prompt resolution.21 The court reasoned that this purpose preserved the
intent of the PRA, prohibiting agencies to cause excessive delays in the
disclosure of public information.' Because the court found that the ap-
pellate jurisdiction provision of the California Constitution does not con-
fer a right of direct appeal in all original jurisdiction superior court cas-
es, the court held that any legislative action to restrict the mode of ap-
pellate review is constitutional so long as the constitutional powers of
the court are not impaired."
B. Chief Justice George's Concurring Opinion
Chief Justice George concurred with the majority but took issue with
the court's broad holding.' 4 Chief Justice George argued that under the
doctrine of judicial restraint, a constitutional holding should never be
broader than necessary to decide the precise facts at issue.' Expressing
a concern that broad legislative authority to substitute extraordinary writ
review for direct appeal could transform the appellate process,26 Chief
Justice George concluded that the constitutional permissibility of the
substitution of review by extraordinary writ in place of direct appeal
should be specific to the PRAO7
21. Id. at 111-13, 893 P.2d at 1175-76, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854-55. For a discussion of
the issuance -of extraordinary writs in the absence of another adequate, speedy remedy
by appeal, see 43 CAL. JuR. 3D Mandamus and Prohibitum §§ 1, 7 (1978 & Supp.
1996). See Kelso, supra note 8 (describing the goals of the appellate system, including
the reduction of unnecessary delay in trial and appellate courts).
22. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 111, 893 P.2d at 1175, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 854. For a dis-
cussion of the delay in California courts as evidenced by a 26396 increase in state
court appeal decisions, see Karl Manheim, The Business of the California Supreme
Court: A Comparative Study, 26 LOY. LA. L REv. 1085 (1993). See generally Robert S.
Thompson, Restructuring of Judicial Pyramid. Expanding the Jurisdiction of the
California Court of Appeal, 28 SANTA CLARA L Ruv. 293, 303-11 (1988) (proposing a
restructuring of appellate jurisdiction to decrease case overload).
23. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 115, 893 P.2d at 1178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
24. Id. at 116, 893 P.2d at 1178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857 (George, C.J., concurring).
25. Id. (George, C.J., concurring).
26. Id. at 116-17, 893 P.2d at 1178-79, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857-58 (George, C.J., con-
curring).
27. Id. at 123-24, 893 P.2d at 1183-84, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 862-63 (George, CJ., con-
curring).
1406
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C. Justice Lucas' Dissenting Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice Lucas disagreed with the majority's hold-
ing that the legislature may limit appellate review to petitions for extraor-
dinary writ.' Justice Lucas argued that the California Constitution guar-
antees litigants a right of appeal, review on the merits, and a written
opinion explaining the reasoning of the court.' Justice Lucas stated that
the legislature cannot eliminate just any constitutionally granted right.'
Justice Lucas further argued that absent rulings on preliminary issues
unrelated to the underlying cause of action, PRA cases have consistently
afforded litigants a right of appeal.31 . Since Justice Lucas believed that
the legislative purpose of section 6259(c) did not preclude a direct appeal
in cases where a party's extraordinary writ is summarily denied, he con-
cluded that the statute should not bar an appeal in the instant case.'
Ill. IMPACT
The holding in Powers will further the policy of expediting the dispo-
sition of cases in California courts.33 There are several policy reasons,
however, that support the use of written opinions. 4 First, written opin-
ions become settled law, usable as precedent for subsequent decisions.'
In addition, many believe the written requirement ensures a careful ex-
amination by the courts.' Furthermore, written opinions inform the
general public, guiding them towards earlier resolution of potential dis-
putes.37 Another concern, as expressed by both the concurring and dis-
senting justices, is the ability of the legislature to allow courts of appeal
to become solely writ courts.' However, the assurance of a speedy and
28. Id. at 125-26, 893 P.2d at 1184-85, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 863-64 (Lucas, J., dissent-
ing).
29. Id. at 126-27, 173, 893 P.2d at 1185-86, 1217, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 864-65, 896
(Lucas, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 151, 893 P.2d at 1202, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 881 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 176-77, 893 P.2d at 1220, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 899 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 128, 893 P.2d at 1186, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 865 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
33. See generaUy Manheim and Thompson, supra note 22.
34. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 141, 893 P.2d at 1195, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 874 (Lucas, J.,
dissenting).
35. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
36. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting). See Kelso, supra note 8 (discussing the advantages of
published written opinions).
38. Powers, 10 Cal. 4th at 173-74, 893 P.2d at 1217-18, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 896-97
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efficient resolution to cases, especially in light of the overflow existent in
California courts, suggests that extraordinary writs are an acceptable
method of review upon legislative determination.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court, through its holding, confirmed that a
litigant's right of appeal does not automatically confer a right to direct
appeal.' Instead, the court found that in cases lacking an adequate ap-
peal remedy, or mandating public necessity for prompt issue resolution,
the legislature may permit extraordinary writs to serve as the exclusive
method of appeal.4 The court's holding extended beyond the scope of
the PRA, finding such legislative actions a valid exercise of appellate
jurisdiction.42
MONICA M. RANDAZZO
(Lucas, J., dissenting).
39. See Kelso, supra note 8 (discussing the use of extraordinary writs to reduce
unnecessary delay in appellate courts); Thompson, supra note 22 (defining the case
overload problem).
40. Pobwers, 10 Cal. 4th at 112-14, 893 P.2d at 1176-77, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855-56.
41. Id. at 113, 893 P.2d at 1176, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 855.
42. Id. at 115, 893 P.2d at 1178, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 857.
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H. CRIMINAL LAW
A. A jury's deadlock on a greater offense of gross vehic-
ular manslaughter followed by a conviction on the
lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter
bars subsequent prosecution of the greater offense
pursuant to the double jeopardy statute, Penal Code
section 1023: People v. Fields.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Fields,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether
constitutional or statutory provisions against double jeopardy barred the
retrial of the defendant on the greater offense (gross vehicular man-
slaughter while intoxicated) on which the jury failed to reach an agree-
ment when, in the same proceeding, the jury returned a guilty'verdict on
a separately charged lesser included offense (vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated)., The supreme court affirmed the court of appeal's3
reversal of the defendant's conviction on the greater offense and rein-
stated the original sentence, holding that pursuant to Penal Code section
1023,4 the defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense barred a
1. 13 Cal. 4th 289, 914 P.2d 832, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 282 (1996). In this decision, re-
tired Chief Justice Lucas, assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council,
delivered the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice George and Justices Arabian,
Baxter, Kennard, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 295-312, 914 P.2d at 834-45, 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 284-95. Justice Mosk wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id at 312, 914
P.2d at 845, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295 (Mosk, J., concurring).
2. Id. at 295-312, 914 P.2d at 834-45, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-95.
3. People v. Fields, 30 Cal. App. 4th 1731, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777 (1994). The court
of appeal's basis for reversing the defendant's conviction was that a retrial on the
greater offense (gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated) was barred by double
jeopardy. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 297, 914 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285. After dis-
missing the greater offense, the court of appeal affirmed the trial court's convictions
and findings on the lesser included offense and reinstated the original sentence. Id.
4. CAL PENAL CODE § 1023 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). Section 1023 provides, in
relevant part:
When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed in
jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is
a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged in such accusatory
pleading, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense necessarily
included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that accusato-
ry pleading.
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subsequent retrial on the greater offense, notwithstanding the first jury's
deadlock on the greater offense.5
11. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
As a basis for its analysis, the majority resolved the apparent tension
between two distinct double jeopardy principles: (1) the "implied acquit-
tal" doctrine, which states that a conviction of a lesser included offense
constitutes an implicit acquittal on the greater offense, thereby barring
its retrial,' and (2) the doctrines of "manifest necessity" and "legal neces-
sity," federal and state exceptions to double jeopardy prohibitions, which
justify retrial of an offense following the discharge of a deadlocked jury.7
Id.; see also Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 305, 914 P.2d at 841, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291
(quoting CAL PENAL CODE § 1023).
5. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 295-312, 914 P.2d at 834-45, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-95. In
Fields, the defendant, later determined to have had a blood-alcohol content of .16%,
drove through a red light and collided with a third party's vehicle, killing the third par-
ty as a result. Id. at 296, 914 P.2d at 834, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284. The defendant was
charged with six offenses: Count I-gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated
(CAL PENAL CODE § 191.5(a)); Count U-vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (CAL
PENAL CODE § 192(c)(3)); Count ri-gross vehicular manslaughter (CAL PENAL CODE
§ 192(c)(1)); Count IV-driving under the influence and causing bodily injury (CAL.
VEH. CODE § 23153(a)); Count V-driving with a blood-alcohol level of .0896 or more
and causing bodily injury (CAL VEH. CODE § 23153(b)); and Count VI--driving with a
suspended license (CAL VEH. CODE § 14601(a)). Id.
Subsequently, although the jury returned verdicts of guilty on Counts 11, IV, V, and
VI, the trial court declared a mistrial and set a date for retrial on Counts I and 111 be-
cause the jury was deadlocked on those counts. Id. at 296-97, 914 P.2d at 834-35, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 284-85. Four months later, the defendant was rearraigned and charged
with Counts I and I, and the case was transferred to a different judge following jury
selection. Id. at 297, 914 P.2d at 835, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 285. After the trial court
dismissed Count Ill, the second jury returned a verdict of guilty on Count I (gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated). Id.
6. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 299, 914 P.2d at 836, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286. The implied
acquittal doctrine has been recognized by both the United States Supreme Court and
California courts. Id.; see also Stone v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 503, 511, 646 P.2d
809, 815, 183 Cal. Rptr. 647, 653 (1982) (stating that "a verdict of guilty on a lesser
included offense constitutes an implied acquittal of the greater offense of which the
jury could have convicted the defendant"); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)
(stating that an acquittal barring subsequent prosecution may be either express or im-
plied by conviction on a lesser included offense, provided the jury had the opportunity
to decide on the greater offense). See generally 1 WIKmN & EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMI-
NAL LAW, Defenses §§ 325-326 (2d ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (stating that a conviction on
a lesser included offense bars further prosecution of the greater offense and setting
forth the elements required of a lesser included offense).
7. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 299-300, 914 P.2d at 836-37, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286-87. For
1410
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Drawing a distinction between a deadlocked jury and a silent jury, the
majority concluded that the doctrine of implied acquittal was inapplica-
ble to situations where the jury expressed its inability to reach an agree-
ment on the greater offense, but applied to instances where the jury was
merely silent on that offense.8 In support of its conclusion, the majority
cited Green v. United States for the proposition that "jeopardy is not
regarded as having come to an end... in those cases where unforesee-
able circumstances ... arise during [the first] trial making its completion
impossible, such as the failure of a jury to agree on a verdict."9 In light
purposes of the federal doctrine of manifest necessity, the defendant is considered to
be in jeopardy once the jurors have been impaneled and sworn Id. at 299, 914 P.2d at
836, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286 (citing Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 38 (1978)). According to
this rule, once the defendant has been placed in jeopardy and the jury is subsequently
discharged, a retrial is not permissible unless the defendant consents to the retrial or
manifest necessity required such a discharge. Id. (citing Green, 355 U.S. at 188). The
United States Supreme Court has adhered to the general principle, first articulated in
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579 (1824); that a jury's discharge resulting
from its failure to agree constitutes manifest necessity and permits retrial of the defen-
dant Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 299-300, 914 P.2d at 836-37, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 286-87.
California's version of this doctrine, the doctrine of legal necessity, permits retrial
when there is a legal necessity for the jury's discharge. Id. Like its federal counterpart,
the California rule provides that a discharge caused by the jury's inability to reach an
agreement is such a legal necessity. Id.; see also CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1140-1141 (per-
mitting retrial following the discharge of a jury if the court determines that "there is
no reasonable probability that the jury can agree"); id. § 1160 (implementing the legal
necessity doctrine in a multiple count situation). See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law
§ 231 (1989). (classifying the discharge of a jury due to manifest necessity as an excep-
tion to double jeopardy prohibitions).
8. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 301, 914 P.2d at 837-38, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287-88 (citing
Selvester v. United States, 170 U.S. 262, 263 (1898). According to the Court in
Selvester, if the jury is silent on certain offenses and is subsequently discharged, the
jury's silence constitutes an acquittal barring retrial as to those offenses for which the
jury fails to return a verdict because "'the record affords no adequate legal cause for
the discharge of the jury.'" Id. (quoting Selvester, 170 U.S. at 269). However, if the jury
is discharged following an expressed jury deadlock, "'[tjhe effect of such entry justifies
the discharge of the jury, and therefore a subsequent prosecution for the offense as to
which the jury has disagreed and on account of which it has been regularly discharged
would not constitute second jeopardy.'" Id. (quoting Selvester, 170 U.S. at 269). See
generally William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L REv.
411 (1993) (discussing the applicability of the implied acquittal doctrine to cases in
which the jury has returned a verdict on a lesser included offense, but was silent on
the greater offense).
9. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 301-02, 914 P.2d at 838, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 (quoting
Green, 355 U.S. at 188) (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). In Green, a
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of Green's conclusion and the Fifth Amendment, the majority held that in
situations where the jury was expressly deadlocked on the greater of-
fense, but returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense, the
conviction on the lesser included offense did not bar a retrial on the
greater offense."°
Following its determination that the implied acquittal doctrine was
inapplicable to the instant case under both federal and state law, the
majority turned its attention to whether the defendant was properly re-
tried on the greater offense." The majority reasoned that when the jury
returned a verdict of guilty on the lesser included offense, the defendant
stood convicted of that offense within the meaning of Penal Code section
1023.2 Pursuant to that section, the majority concluded that the con-
viction on the lesser included offense barred a subsequent prosecution
jury's silence on the greater offense did not constitute manifest necessity to discharge
the jury; therefore, retrial of the defendant on the greater offense was barred. Id. See
generally 1 WrrmuN & EpsTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Defenses §§ 290, 292 (2d eL
1988 & Supp. 1996) (classifying a jury's inability to agree as an instance where the
ensuing discharge of the jury would be the result of legal necessity, thereby precluding
a defendant from asserting a defense based on double jeopardy principles); 20 CALj
Jun. 3D Criminal Law § 2330 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (summarizing the effect of jury
discharge as a result of the jury's inability to agree); 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law
§ 303 (1981) (discussing the ramifications of a jury discharge based on the jury's fail-
ure to agree).
10. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 301, 914 P.2d at 838, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288. The majority
held that both federal and state double jeopardy principles supported the conclusion
that a jury deadlock on the greater offense did not constitute an implied acquittal of
the lesser included offense. Id.; see also U.S. CONsT. amend. V (guaranteeing that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or
limb"); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (stating that "[p]ersons may not twice be put in jeopar-
dy for the same offense"); Mauk v. State, 605 A.2d 157, 171 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992)
(holding that a retrial on the greater offense, following the declaration of a mistrial
due to a hung jury, was not barred by federal double jeopardy prohibitions even
though the jury had returned a guilty verdict on the lesser included offense). But qf
People v. Fisher, 632 N.E.2d 689, 692-95 (m. App. Ct. 1994) (stating that there is no
analytical distinction between jury deadlock and jury silence for double jeopardy pur-
poses). See generally 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 233 (1989) (stating that "[t]he discharge
of the jury by the court without verdict, where there is no reasonable expectation that
they will be able to agree, does not bar another trial").
11. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 305-07, 914 P.2d at 840-42, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-92.
12. Id. at 305, 914 P.2d at 840, 52 Cal Rptr. 2d at 290. See also supra note 4 (set-
ting forth the language of Penal Code § 1023). See generally Janis L Ettinger, In
Search of a Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50 BRooK. L REV. 191
(1984) (explaining the justifications for and the application of the lesser included of-
fense doctrine); Colonel James A. Young m, Multiplicity and Lesser-Included Offenses,
39 A.F. L Rav. 159 (1996) (setting forth the role of the lesser included offense doc-
trine in criminal prosecutions for multiple offenses).
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on the greater offense, notwithstanding the first jury's deadlock on the
greater offense. 3
According to the majority's interpretation of the acquittal-first rule
established in People v. Kurtzman, the jury may deliberate on the greater
and lesser included offenses in any order, but must acquit the defendant
of the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser offense.14
Contrary to Kurtzman, when the jury in the instant case rendered a
verdict of guilty only on the lesser included offense without a corre-
sponding acquittal on the greater offense, its verdict of conviction was
13. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 305, 914 P.2d at 840-41, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 290-91. Accord-
ing to the majority, underlying the principle that a conviction on the lesser included
offense was a bar to retrial of the greater offense was the notion that, once a convic-
tion on the lesser included offense has been obtained, a conviction on the greater
offense would have the effect of being a double conviction on the lesser offense. Id.
at 306, 914 P.2d at 841, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291; see also People v. Greer, 30 Cal. 2d
589, 596-97, 184 P.2d 512, 516-17 (1947) (interpreting § 1023 to bar a subsequent retrial
of the greater offense once a. defendant has been convicted of a lesser included of-
fense). But cf. People v. Pearson, 42 Cal. 3d 351, 355, 721 P.2d 595, 596, 228 Cal. Rptr.
509, 511 (1986) (recognizing a rule prohibiting convictions of both the greater offense
and lesser included offenses). See generally 20 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law § 2322
(1985) (setting forth the doctrine of implied acquittal as it pertains to double jeopardy
principles); 17 CAL. Jun. 3D Criminal Law §§ 78-79 (1984) (defining "lesser included
offense" and discussing the consequences of convicting a defendant of both a lesser in-
cluded offense and the greater offense in the same proceeding).
14. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 308-09, 914 P.2d at 843, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293 (citing
People v. Kurtzman, 46 Cal. 3d 322, 758 P.2d 572, 250 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1988)).
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incomplete." The majority stated the consequence of such jury action
as follows:
[O]nce the jury is discharged after rendering a verdict of guilty on the lesser in-
cluded offense, without a corresponding verdict of acquittal on the greater of-
fense, the defendant stands convicted of the lesser included offense, and retrial on
the greater offense is barred notwithstanding the jury's deadlock on that
charge.
6
Therefore, although the jury's conviction of the defendant on the lesser
included offense did not constitute an implied acquittal of the greater
offense, retrial on the greater offense was barred by section 1023, not-
withstanding the jury's deadlock on the greater offense. 7
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring Opinion
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Mosk concurred with the
judgment and holding of the majority, but observed that the lesser in-
cluded offense and the greater offense in the instant case constituted the
"same offense" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.'" Therefore,
15. Id. at 309, 914 P.2d at 843, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 293. According to the majority,
"[uinder these circumstances, the trial court is permitted, pursuant to section 1161, to
direct the jury to reconsider its verdict of conviction in, light of the acquittal-first rule."
Id. at 310, 914 P.2d at 844, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294. Section 1161 provides in pertinent
part
When there is a verdict of conviction, in which it appears to the [c]ourt that
the jury have mistaken the law, the [clourt may explain the reason for that
opinion and direct the jury to reconsider their verdict, and if after the re-
consideration, they return the same verdict, it must be entered. ...
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1161 (West 1985 & Supp. 1996). In such instances of mistake of
law, the incomplete conviction on the lesser included offense "does not implicate a
defendant's double jeopardy interest in avoiding retrial on the greater offense." Fields,
13 Cal. 4th at 310-11, 914 P.2d at 844, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294. By contrast, if rather
than committing a mistake of law the jury renders an incomplete verdict of conviction
on the lesser included offense followed by the jury's discharge, "the trial court no
longer has jurisdiction to direct jurors to reconsider their irregular verdict." Id. at 311,
914 P.2d at 844, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294.
16. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 311, 914 P.2d at 844-45, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 294-95.
17. Id. at 312, 914 P.2d at 845, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
18. Id. (Mosk, J., concurring). See generally James A. Bell, IV & Todd Richman,
Twenty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 84 GEO. UJ. 1076 (1996) (speci-
fying the types of prosecutorial proceedings that are barred by the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment); 1 WrrmaN & EPSTEIN, CAuFomNA CRMINAL LAw, De-
fenses § 271 (2d ed. 1989) (outlining the guarantees contained in the Federal Consti-
tution, California Constitution, and California statutes against placing a defendant twice
in jeopardy); 20 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 2314 (1985) (stating that conviction, ac-
quittal, or jeopardy is a bar to further prosecution for the same offense, for an attempt
of the same offense, or for an offense necessarily included therein).
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concluded Justice Mosk, the double jeopardy clause barred retrial of the
greater offense after the defendant was convicted of the lesser included
offense. 9
Ill. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Prior to Fields, the supreme court had not reconciled the doctrine of
implied acquittal and the doctrine of manifest or legal necessity as they
have pertained to instances where the jury had convicted a defendant of
a lesser included offense, but was deadlocked on the greater offense.
Although the majority affirmed the continued validity of both doctrines,
the court found the implied acquittal doctrine inapplicable to situations
where the jury is expressly deadlocked, rather than silent, on the greater
offense.'
The discharge of the jury following a deadlock, pursuant to the doc-
trine of manifest or legal necessity, normally would have permitted retri-
al of the defendant on the greater offense.2 Notwithstanding the jury's
deadlock and the effect of the doctrine of manifest or legal necessity
thereon, the court concluded that, pursuant to Penal Code section 1023,
the defendant's conviction of the lesser included offense barred a subse-
quent retrial on the greater offense.'
JOSEPH E. FOSS
19. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 312, 914 P.2d at 845, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295 (Mosk, J.,
concurring). See generally 20 CAL. JuR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2313-2343 (1985) (dis-
cussing the scope and effect of double jeopardy principles in terms of both the Fifth
Amendment and the California Constitution and their impact on criminal proceedings);
21 AM. Jun. 2D Criminal Law §§ 243-320 (1981) (summarizing the federal prohibitions
against placing a defendant twice in jeopardy during criminal proceedings).
20. Fields, 13 Cal. 4th at 301, 914 P.2d at 837, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287.
21. Id. at 300, 914 P.2d at 837, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287.
22. Id. at 312, 914 P.2d at 845, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 295.
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B. A murder victim's statements to her daughter that
she was going to another city with the defendant
and that daughter should call her aunt if victim did
not return were admissible into evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule. Also, there may be a
special circumstance to impose the death penalty
where the murder victim was not an eyewitness to
the defendant's prior crime: People v. Jones.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Jones,' the court considered two issues. First, the court
addressed whether a murder victim's statements to her daughter that
she was leaving with the defendant and that the daughter should call her
aunt in the event that the victim did not return were admissible at trial
as an exception to the hearsay rule.2 Second, the court determined
whether a special circumstance exists to impose the death penalty when
the murder victim, who could have testified against the defendant regard-
ing another crime, was not an eyewitness to the prior crime.3 The trial
court admitted the evidence, convicted the defendant of first-degree mur-
der, and under special circumstances, sentenced him to death.4 The
1. 13 Cal. 4th 535, 917 P.2d 1165, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 42 (1996). Chief Justice George
wrote for the majority. Id. at 537, 917 P.2d 1166, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. Justices Mosk,
Kennard, Werdegar, Chin, Lillie, and Lucas concurred. Id. at 551, 917 P.2d at 1175, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52.
2. Id. at 547, 917 P.2d at 1173, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50. The defendant was convict-
ed of fatally shooting Carolyn Grayson. Id. at 537, 917 P.2d at 1166-67, 54 Cal Rptr. 2d
at 43-44. Prior to Grayson's death, Grayson and the defendant lived together and had
"maintained a stormy romantic relationship." Id. at 537, 917 P.2d at 1167, 54 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 44. Evidence introduced at trial showed that the defendant killed Grayson in
order to prevent her from testifying that he was responsible for the murder of a neigh-
bor, Janet Brenner. Id at 537-38, 917 P.2d'at 1169, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44. The su-
preme court discussed several facts not at issue in this case, such as the death of
Janet Brenner, Grayson's statements to others, the plot to kill Grayson, as well as the
defendant's statements. Id. at 538-40, 917 P.2d at 1167-69, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-46.
At issue in this case was the admissibility of statements by Grayson to her daughter
prior to her death. Id. at 548, 917 P.2d at 1173, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50. At trial,
Grayson's daughter testified that her mother had stated that she was leaving that
night with the defendant and that if she did not return, the daughter was to call her
aunt. Id. at 541, 917 P.2d at 1169, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46. The trial court admitted the
statement over defense hearsay and leading question objections. Id.
3. Id. at 549, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51. The defendant contended
that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury that for a special circum-
stance, the victim must have been an eyewitness to the prior crime. Id. at 550, 917
P.2d at 1175, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52. The supreme court disagreed. Id.
4. Id. at 537, 917 P.2d at 1166, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 43.
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court vacated the conviction on separate grounds' and held that the
statement of the murder victim to her daughter instructing her to call her
aunt in the event she did not return was properly admitted as a state-
ment of the declarant's state of mind.' Further, the court held that the
killing of any witness to a prior crime who might testify in a future crimi-
nal proceeding constitutes a special circumstance to impose the death
penalty.7
II. TREATMENT
A. The Murder Victim's Statement
Chief Justice George, writing for a unanimous court, rejected three
arguments offered by the defendant.' First, he concluded that the
daughter's statement was not inadmissible hearsay. The Chief Justice
rejected the defendant's contention that People v. Alcalde 9 should be
overruled based on the legislature's enactment of Evidence Code Sec-
5. Id. In a separate habeus corpus proceeding, the court vacated the conviction
based on deficient performance by the defendant's counsel Id. For a discussion of
the companion case, see In re Jones, 13 Cal 4th 552, 917 P.2d 1175, 54 Cal Rptr. 52
(1996); see also 6 B.E. WrrmN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CALIFORNIA CRMINAL LAW, Ex-
traordinary Writs § 3350 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that ineffective counsel is one of those
rights "regarded as so fundamental that [its] denial or substantial impairment consti-
tutes a violation of due process . . ."). Because the conviction was vacated, the court
in this case stated that it was providing guidance for issues that would likely arise in
the new trial. People v. Jones, 13 Cal 4th at 537, 917 P.2d at 1167, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
44.
6. Id. at 549, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
7. Id. at 550, 917 P.2d at 1175, 54 Cal Rptr. 2d at 51.
8. Id. at 547-49, 917 P.2d at 1173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50-51.
9. Id. at 547-48, 917 P.2d at 1173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50-51. Hearsay evidence is
commonly defined as "evidence of a statement that was made other than by a witness
while testifying at the hearing and that is offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated." 1 B.E. WrraN, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE, The Hearsay Rule § 574 (3d. ed. 1986).
See generally Christopher B. Mueller, Post-Modern Hearsay Reform: The Importance of
Complexity, 76 MINN. L REV. 567 (1992) (discussing the justifications and criticisms of
the hearsay doctrine); Diana L Nelson, State v. Walker: The North Carolina Supreme
Court's State of Mind Concerning the Admissibility of Evidence 'Under the Rule
803(3) Hearsay Exception in Criminal Cases, 71 N.C. L REV. 2038 (1993) (stating
that liberalization of the hearsay exception has led to "significant sentiment in favor of
.Rules reform" throughout the nation).
10. 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944). For a discussion of Alcalde, see 1 B.E.
WITKIN, CAuIFORNIA EVIDENCE, Te Hearsay Rule § 755 (3d ed. 1986).
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tion 1250," which codified the court's ruling in Alcalde.2 In Alca/de,
the court held that "declarations of present intent are admissible to
prove a future act."3 Because the Alcalde ruling had been codified and
the statement in the instant case was offered to prove conduct of the
declarant in conformity with that state of mind, the court refused to
review the holding. 4
Second, the court addressed the statement's trustworthiness. 5 The
defendant contended that under Evidence Code Section 1252,6 the
statement was untrustworthy because Grayson was a prostitute and had
never informed her daughter where she was going or why she was leav-
ing. 7 However, there was no evidence that Grayson ever lied to her
daughter. 8 Furthermore, the court determined that because Grayson
usually did not disclose her destinations to her daughter, it was inferable
that on this occasion she wanted her daughter to know her plans. 9
Thus; the court determined that the statement carried a higher probabili-
ty of trustworthiness.
Lastly, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Grayson's
instructions to her daughter to call her aunt in the event she did not
return implied that Grayson believed she would never return.21 More-
over, the defendant contended that the statement further implied that
11. CAL EvID. CODE § 1250 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1995) (stating that "evidence of a
statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind ... is not made inadmissible
by the hearsay rule when . . . [t]he evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state
of mind. . . or explain acts or conduct of the declarant"). For further discussion re-
garding state of mind and intent as evidence of future act, see 1 B.E. WrnuN, CAuFOR-
NIA EVIDENCE, The Hearsay Rule § 752 (3d ed. 1986). See also 31 CAL Jun. 3D Evi-
denie §§ 270 & 273 (1976 & Supp. 1996) (stating that state of mind may be used 'to
prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant" as well as "to prove that he did
those acts").
12. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 548, 917 P.2d at 1173-74, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 50-51.
13. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d at 186, 148 P.2d at 631; see Amanda Bartlett Meak, Note, The
Death of Res Gestae and Other Developments in Missouri Hearsay Law, 60 Mo. L
REv. 991 (1995) (stating that for purposes of the hearsay exception, courts should dis-
tinguish between direct assertions of declarant's state of mind and declarant's state-
ments used to show then-existing state of mind).
14. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 548, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
15. Id. at 548-49, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
16. CAL Evm. CODE § 1252 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1995) ("Evidence of a statement
is inadmissible under this article if the statement was made under circumstances such
as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness."); see also 31 CAL JUP. 3D Evidence § 269
(1976) (restating the general rule under Evidence Code Section 1252).
17. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 548, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
18. Id. at 548-49, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
19. Id. at 549, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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Grayson feared him and that she anticipated that he might kill her.' In
contrast, the court held that Grayson's statement could just as easily
been interpreted as implying that Grayson believed she may not return
that night.' Additionally, the court noted that the defendant failed to
object on these grounds at trial.' Thus, the court concluded that the
trial court properly admitted the statement.'
B. The Special Circumstance Issue
In the second part of the opinion, the court held that the killing of any
witness to a prior crime supports a special circumstance for imposing
the death penalty.' The court rejected the defendant's contention that
the witness must be an eyewitnessY To support its conclusion, the
court cited People v. Allen,' which found a special circumstance where
the victim was not an eyewitness, "but had received information impli-
cating the defendant in [the] crime... ."' The court then stated the
general rule that "[i]f an accused believes himself to be exposed to crimi-
nal prosecution and intentionally kills another to prevent that person
from testifying in an anticipated or pending criminal proceeding, the
special circumstance may be found true .. . ."o Because the court
22. 1d
23. Id. For a discussion of federal courts' inconsistent interpretation of the state of
mind exception, see Diane Kiesel, Comment, One Person's Thoughts, Another Per-
son's Acts: How the Federal Circuit Courts Interpret the Hillmon Doctrine, 33 CATi.
U. L REv. 699 (1984); see also David E. Seidelson, Symposium, The Federal Rules of
Evidence: A Few Surprises, 12 HOFSTR L REV. 453 (1984) (discussing federal circuit
courts' differing interpretations of the state of mind exception).
24. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 549, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
25. Id. For a comprehensive discussion of "declarant state of mind" rules, see 29
Am. JuR. 2D Evidence § 667 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
26. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 550, 917 P.2d at 1175, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52.
27. Id. See generally 22 CAL JU. 3D Criminal Law § 3341 (1985 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing the substantive requirements for special circumstances including the require-
ments for imposition of the death penalty, and the *dlling of a witness to a prior
crime); 3 B.E. WmaN & NORMAN L EPSm, CAuWORNIA CRIMNAL LAW, Punishment for
Crime § 1576 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (outlining the three elements required for a
showing of special circumstances).
28. 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986).
29. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 550, 917 P.2d at 1175, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 52 (citing Allen,
42 CaL 3d at 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849).
30. Id. (quoting People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57
(1985)).
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found nothing indicating an "eyewitness requirement," the court rejected
the defendant's argument."'
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
Prior to the court's opinion in Jones, the rule was well established in
California for more than fifty years that state of mind evidence is adms-
sible to show the declarant's present intent to perform a future act. 2
The rule was codified in 1965,' and the decision in Jones leaves the
rule unchanged.'M In addition, the rule that the murder of any witness to
a prior crime is sufficient for a special circumstance has been established
for over ten years.' Because the court has left these well-established
rules undisturbed, it is doubtful that this case will have a great impact on
the law of evidence.
JEREMY D. DOLNICK
31. Id.; see 22 CAL. Jun. 3D Criminal Law § 3343 (1985 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the strict requirements for a finding of special circumstances by the trier of fact); 3
B.E. WrriuN & NORMAN L EPSTEIN, CAUFORNIA CRIMINAL LAw, Punishment for Crime
§§ 1588 & 1589 (2d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (stating the general and special findings
required for a showing of special circumstances).
32. People v. Alcalde, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P.2d 627 (1944).
33. Jones, 13 Cal. 4th at 548, 917 P.2d at 1174, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 51.
34. CAL EViD. CODE § 1250 (Deering 1986 & Supp. 1995).
35. People v. Allen, 42 Cal. 3d 1222, 729 P.2d 115, 232 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1986); People
v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1985).
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C. Judges have the power to strike prior felony convic-
tions in furtherance of justice in three strike cases:
People v. Romero.
I. INTRODUCTION
In People v. Romero,' the California Supreme Court examined whether
a court may, on its own motion, strike prior felony convictions in cases
arising under California Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12, com-
monly referred to as the "three strikes" provisions.2 In Romero, the trial
1. 13 Cal. 4th 497, 917 P.2d 628, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 789 (1996). Justice Werdegar
delivered the majority opinion and Chief Justice George, Justice Mosk, Justice Kennard,
Justice Baxter, and Justice Lucas concurred. Id. at 504-33, 917 P.2d at 629-49, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 790-810. Justice Chin wrote a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 533-34,
917 P.2d at 649-51, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810-11 (Chin, J., concurring). The Honorable
Malcolm M. Lucas retired in May 1996, prior to this decision. See Bob Egelko, Chief
Justice Lucas Announces Retirement, LA. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995 (briefly discussing
the retirement of Justice Lucas and some of his notable rulings). Justice Lucas was
able to participate in the decision of this case pursuant to a provision in the California
Constitution which provides that a "retired judge who consents may be assigned to any
court" by the Chief Justice. CAL CONST. art. VI, § 6.
2. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 504, 917 P.2d at 630, 53 Cal. Rptr 2d at 791. California
Penal Code §§ 667(b)-(i) and 1170,12 are two nearly identical statutes. Id, Section 667
is a provision drafted by the legislature while § 1170.12 is a voter initiative. Id. Both
provisions provide, in relevant part, that if a defendant has been convicted of two or
more "violent" or "serious" felonies, the imposed sentence is "an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A) & 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 1988 &
Supp. 1997). There are further provisions which detail the possibility of parole after a
"minimum term." CAL PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) & 1170.12 (c)(2)(A)(iii) (West
1985 & Supp. 1997). "The prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior
felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section 1385, or if
there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction. If upon the satisfac-
tion of the court that there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony convic-
tion, the court may dismiss or strike the allegation." CAL PENAL CODE §§ 667(f(2) and
1170.12(d)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). See Christine Markel, Comment, A Swing and
A Miss: California's Three Strikes Law, 17 WHmrER L REV. 651 (1996) (outlining a
thorough history of the three strikes law including relevant cases that contributed to
public opinion); David C. Owen, Comment, Striking Out Juveniles: A Reexamination
of the Right to a Jury Trial in Light of California's "Three Strikes" Legislation, 29
U.C. DAVIS L REV. 437 (1996) (discussing the effect of three strikes laws on juveniles);
Keith C. Owens, Comment, California's "Three Strikes" Debacle: A Volatile Mixture of
Fear, Vengeance, and Demagoguery Will Unravel the Criminal Justice System and
Bring California to its Knees, 25 Sw. U. L REV. 129 (1995) (discussing the problems
California will face if judges are unable to use discretion in the sentencing process).
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court judge, without a motion from the prosecution, struck the
defendant's prior felony convictions.3 The district attorney petitioned for
writ of mandamus to vacate the judge's order arguing that under the
express language of Penal Code section 667(b)-(i),4 the judge did not
have the power to dismiss prior felony allegations except upon request
by the prosecution.' The court of appeal issued the district attorney's
writ finding that the trial court could not dismiss prior felony convictions
on its own motion.6 Reversing in part, the California Supreme Court held
that trial courts could, on their own motion, strike prior felony allega-
tions.'
3. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 793. In Romero,
the district attorney filed an information charging Jesus Romero with possession of a
controlled substance. Id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 CaL Rptr. 2d at 792. Included in
the indictment were the defendant's prior convictions which consisted of second degree
burglary, attempted burglary of an inhabited dwelling, first degree burglary of an inhab-
ited dwelling, and possession of a controlled substance. Id. The burglary and attempted
burglary charges would count as "strikes," making the defendant eligible for a life sen-
tence. Id. The defendant originally plead not guilty, however, the judge made a deal
with him to change his plea in exchange for striking the defendant's prior convictions
for three strike purposes. Id. at 507, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. The
defendant was sentenced to six years, three years for the possession charge and three
consecutive one-year enhancements for the prior felony, convictions. Id.
For a discussion on how a state has the authority to punish offenders with prior
convictions more severely than first time offenders, see 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1598
(1989 & Supp. 1996). For discussions on what constitutes a prior conviction, see R.
Daniel O'Conner, Note, Defining the Strike Zone-An Analysis of the Classification of
Prior Convictions Under the Federal "Three-Strikes and You're Out" Scheme, 36 B.C.
L REv. 847 (1995) and 39 Am. JuR. 2D Habitual Criminals § 8 (1968 & Supp. 1995).
4. Penal Code § 667 became effective on March 7, 1994 while § 1170.12 did not
take effect until November 9, 1994. Romem, 13 Cal. 4th at 505, 917 P.2i at 630-31, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791-92. While the defendant was charged with a crime committed on
May 9, 1994, and therefore, only § 1170.12 applied, the court nonetheless discussed
both sections. Id. at 505, 917 P.2d at 631, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
5. Id. at 506, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793. For a general discussion on
the powers and conduct of a judge, see 21 CAL. JUn. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2935-2943
(1995 & Supp. 1996). For a general discussion on the acceptable conduct of the pros-
ecutor, see 21 CAL. Jt. 3D Criminal Law §§ 2949-2971 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
6. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 506, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
7. Id. at 532, 917 P.2d at 649, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers was not violated.
The supreme court first considered the defendant's contention that if
the statute was interpreted to allow only the prosecution to make a mo-
tion to strike the priors, separation of powers would be violated.' The
court discussed its decision in People v. Tenorio' where a similar stat-
ute ° was held to violate the doctrine of separation of powers.' The
court in Tenorio discussed the concept that the judge works in a judicial
capacity while the prosecutor is a member of the executive branch." In
Romero, the California Supreme Court summarized the Tenorio decision
as stating that once the prosecutor decides to indict, the process be-
comes judicial, and that a law requiring the prosecutor to consent to the
8. Id. at 508, 917 P.2d at 633, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794. The California Constitution
states: "The powers of state government are legislative, executive, and judicial. Persons
charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except
as permitted by this Constitution." CAL CONST. art. Ill, § 3. For a historical discussion
on the doctrine of separation of powers that focuses on Madison and the Federalist
Papers, see Victoria Nourse, Toward a "Due Foundation" for the Separation of Powers:'
The Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 Tix. L REV. 447 (1996). For a modern
discussion of separation of powers emphasizing recent justices who have impacted the
current interpretation of the doctrine, including Justice Scalia and Justice White, see
Matthew J. Tanielian, Separation of Powers and the Supreme Court. One Doctrine,
Two Visions, 8 ADMIN. U. Am. U. 961 (1995). See generally 7 B.E. WITIN, SUMMARY
OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 107 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp. 1996) (discussing
the nature of the separation of powers doctrine).
9. 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970). This case overruled the
California Supreme Court's decision rendered only eight years prior in People v.
Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 375 P.2d 641, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (holding that the ability
to allow only the prosecutor to dismiss a case is valid based on the common-law pow-
er of nole prosequi).
10. California Health & Safety Code § 11718 states:
No allegation of fact which, if admitted or found to be true, would change
the penalty for the offense charged from what the penalty would be if such
fact were not alleged and admitted or proved to be true may not be dis-
missed by the court or stricken from the accusatory pleading except upon
motion of the district attorney.
CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11718 (repealed 1972).
11. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d at 95, 473 P.2d at 997, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
12. Id. at 94, 473 P.2d at 996, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
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dismissal of the prior felony allegations at that point would "unaccept-
ably compromise[] judicial independence."13
The supreme court then stated that the separation of powers doctrine
was not offended in this case.14 The court explained that separation of
powers would only be offended if the law was construed to remove a
judge's discretion in dismissing prior convictions in furtherance of jus-
tice.15
2. The court interpreted Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 as
giving judges discretion to strike prior convictions.
The California Supreme Court next noted that if it can interpret Cali-
fornia Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i) and 1170.12 in a way that makes
them constitutional, it must do so." The court focused on Penal Code
section 1385, which gives the court the general power to strike priors in
furtherance of justice.17 The supreme court stated that unless there was
13. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 512, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796. Tenorlo
has been subsequently used by the California Supreme Court to find other statutes
unconstitutional- See People v. Navarro, 7 Cal. 3d 248, 497 P.2d 481, 102 Cal. Rptr. 1:37
(1972) (holding unconstitutional a statute that required the prosecutor to consent be-
fore a judge could order a defendant into a treatment facility for drug addicts);
Esteybar v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 119, 485 P.2d 1140, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1971)
(unanimously finding a statute unconstitutional that required prosecutorial approval for
a judge to treat a wobbler as a misdemeanor); People v. Superior Court of San Mateo
County, 11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974) (finding unconstitutional
a statute that allowed a prosecutor to veto the judge's decision to divert a defendant
charged with a narcotics offense into a pretrial treatment program).
14. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 513, 917 P.2d at 635, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 509, 917 P.2d at 632, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
If a statute is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will render it
constitutional and the other unconstitutional in whole or in part, or raise
serious and doubtful constitutional questions, the court will adopt the con-
struction which, without doing violence to the reasonable meaning of the lan-
guage used, will render it valid in its entirety, or free from doubt as to its
constitutionality, even though the other construction is equally reasonable.
The basis of this rule is the presumption that the Legislature intended, not to
violate the Constitution, but to enact a valid statute within the scope of its
constitutional powers.
Id. at 509, 917 P.2d at 633, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794 (quoting Miller v. Municipal Court,
22 Cal. 2d 818, 828, 142 P.2d 297, 303 (1943) (discussing proper court jurisdiction for
cases brought under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942)); see also 7 B.E.
WrrIaN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Constitutional Law § 96 (9th ed. 1988 & Supp.
1996) (discussing construction in favor of the constitutionality of a statute).
17. California Penal Code § 1385 provides that-
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clear legislative intent eliminating the power the courts are given under
Penal Code section 1385(a), California Penal Code sections 667(b)-(i) and
1170.12 should not be read as abolishing that power in three strike situa-
tions.' Canvassing the tumultuous history of Penal Code section
1385,"9 the court reasoned that the legislature would not have included a
provision in California Penal Code sections 667(f)(2) and 1170.12 that
allows the prosecuting attorney to strike a prior felony conviction "pur-
suant to 1385" unless they also intended the court to retain its power
under section 1385.0
The court next addressed the district attorney's argument that the
language of Penal Code section 1385(b) eliminates a court's power to
strike prior felony convictions in three strike cases.2' Penal Code sec-
tion 1385(b) states, "[tihis section does not authorize a judge to strike
any prior conviction of a serious felony for purposes of enhancement of
a sentence under Section 667."2' The court noted defendant's three argu-
ments: (1) Penal Code section 1385(b) was added to the Penal Code in
1986, and at that time, Penal Code section 667 did not contain the "three
strikes" provision;' (2) only Penal Code section 1170.12 is valid because
(a) The judge or magistrate may, either of his or her own motion or upon
the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice,
order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the dismissal must be set
forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal shall'be made for
any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory pleading.
(b) This section does not authorize a judge to strike any prior conviction of
a serious felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence under Section
667.
CAL PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1996).
18. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 518, 917 P.2d at 640, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 801.
19. Id. at 509-14, 917 P.2d at 633-36, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794-97.
20. Id. at 521-22, 917 P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803; see also People v. Burke,
47 Cal. 2d 45, 301 P.2d 241 (1956) (unanimously holding that § 1385 gave trial courts
the power to strike sentencing allegations in furtherance of justice), overruled by Peo-
ple v. Sidener, 58 Cal. 2d 645, 375 P.2d 641, 25 CaL Rptr. 697 (1962) (holding trial
courts could not strike prior convictions except, on motion of prosecutor), overruled by
People v. Tenorio, 3 Cal. 3d 89, 473 P.2d 993, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249 (1970); People v. Tan-
ner, 24 Cal. 3d 514, 596 P.2d 328, 156 Cal. Rptr. 450 (1979) (holding that judges could
not discuss criminal firearm charges using § 1385).
21. Romero; 13 Cal. 4th at 522, 917. P.2d at 642, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 803.
22. CAL PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 1996).
23. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 525-26, 917 P.2d at 645, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806. In 1986,
§ 667 contained what is now § 667(a), which includes the provision mandating five-
year enhancements for prior serious felonies. CAL PENAL CODE § 667(a) (West 1996).
1425
section 1170.12 was enacted later than section 667, thus 1170.12, which is
not mentioned in section 1385, is not affected by the section 1385 lan-
guage;24 and (3) the term enhancement does not apply to three strikes
situations.25 While the court did not fully address these issues, it did
find that the defendant's arguments created enough doubt to show that
there was not "clear legislative intent" to eliminate the courts discretion
under section 1385.26
B. Justice Chin's Concurring Opinion
In a brief concurring opinion, Justice Chin agreed that the clear legis-
lative intent necessary to ,eliminate the court's power to strike prior felo-
ny convictions was absent.27 The majority's treatment of the separation
of powers issue precipitates Justice Chin's separate concurring opin-
ion.' Justice Chin asserted that even if the statute were interpreted as
eliminating the court's power to strike prior felony convictions, such an
interpretation would not violate the doctrine of separation of powers.'
Ill. IMPACT
Romero allows judges to use discretion to strike prior felony convic-
tions.' Presumably, Romero will reduce the number of defendants that
receive life sentences under the three strikes provision, although the
extent of such a decrease is impossible to determine.3 Other issues are
also presented by this decision. For example, the court stated that
Romero will be fully retroactive.' This will undoubtably create a back-
24. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 526, 917 P.2d at 645, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806; see ahso
Petaluma v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 44 Cal. 2d 284, 282 P.2d 43 (1955) (holding when
two statutes deal with the same subject, the more recent prevails).
25. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 526-27, 917 P.2d at 645-46, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806-07.
The attorney general agreed with the defendant on this point, writing in his brief,
"[w]e have previously made plain our belief that the three strikes statute is not an 'en-
hancement'" Id. at 527, 917 P.2d at 646, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 807.
26. Id. at 525, 917 P.2d at 645, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 806.
27. Id. at 533, 917 P.2d at 649-50, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810-11 (Chin, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 533, 917 P.2d at 650, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 811 (Chin, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 533-534, P.2d at 649-650, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 810-11 (Chin, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 529-30, 917 P.2d at 647, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 808.
31. Currently, there are an estimated 16,000 people who have been sentenced under
the three strikes law. Henry J. Reske, Three Strikes, You Might Be Out, 82 A.B.A. J.,
Sept 1996, at 26. All of these cases will be reviewed to see if the court understood
that it had the discretion to strike prior felony allegations. Id. The current interprela-
tion will also apply to all new cases coming up through the court system. Id.
32. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 530 n.13, 917 P.2d at 648 n.13, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809
n.13.
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log in the criminal courts."' Also, county public defenders offices, who
do not generally deal with appeals issues, are overseeing the review of
these cases due to the phrasing of footnote thirteen.' 4 This is also con-
tributing to a backlog of cases at the offices of local public defenders.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court did not find that California Penal Code
sections 667(0(2) and 1170.12 violated the doctrine of separation of pow-
Our holding, which relates only to sentencing, is fully retroactive. A defen-
dant serving a sentence under the Three Strikes law imposed by a court that
misunderstood the scope of its discretion to strike prior felony conviction
allegations in furtherance of justice pursuant to 1385(a), may raise the issue
on appeal, or, if relief on appeal is no longer available, may file a petition
for habeas corpus to secure reconsideration of the sentence. Such a petition
should be filed in the sentencing court. ...
Id. (citations omitted); see also Harold J. Krent, The Puzzling Boundary Between
Criminal and Civil Retroactive Lawmaking, 84 GEO. LJ. 2143 (1996) (discussing retro-
active lawmaldng generally); 7 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Constitutional
Law §§ 495, 496 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing whether statutes and initiatives should be
constructed retroactively).
33. See generally Pamela M. Rosenblatt, Note, The Dilemma of Overmrowding in the
Nation's Prisons: What are Constitutional Conditions and What can be Done?, 8
N.Y.L ScR. J. HUM. RTs. 489 (1991) (discussing the problems caused by the nation's
prisons which are on average operating at over 12096 of capacity); Terence P.
Thornberry & Jack E. Call, Constitutional Challenges to Prison Overcrowding: The
Scientific Evidence of Harmful Effects, 35 HASTINGS LJ. 313 (1983) (discussing the
effects of overcrowding on inmates).
34. The role of the county public defender is to see cases through trial court sen-
tencing. See CAL. Gov'r CODE § 27706 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997) (discussing the duties
of public defenders). The role of the state public defender is to represent defendants
on appeal, petition for hearing, or petition for rehearing in an appellate court. See CAL
GOV'T. CODE § 15421 (West 1992) (discussing the duties and powers of the state public
defender); Erwin v. Appellate Dep't of the Superior Court of Ventura County, 146 Cal.
App. 3d 715, 194 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1983) (finding that providing representation for indi-
gent criminal appellants is the duty of the state public defender). In Romero, however,
the supreme court states that the petition for writ of habeas corpus should be filed
with the sentencing court; thus, the county public defender's, office is still obligated to
represent the defendants. Romero, 13 Cal. 4th at 530 n.13, 917 P.2d at 648 n.13, 53
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 809 n.13. See generally 39 Am. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus §§ 1-177 (1968)
(thoroughly discussing the writ of habeas corpus).
35. Telephone interview with Jean Farley, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, Ventura
County (Nov. 17, 1996). The County of Ventura has had to develop a new section
within the defender's office and hire new staff to deal with the influx of cases. Id.
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ers. Instead, they interpreted the statutes to mean that both the judge
and the prosecuting attorney can strike prior felony convictions in fur-
therance of justice in three strike cases.'
KELLY C. QUINN
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III. DEEDS
A deed to a railroad company that purported to convey a
'Wight of way" actually conveyed a fee interest and not
an easement; this determination was fact-specific, and
the court examined extrinsic evidence to illuminate the
parties' intent: City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior
Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court,' the California Su-
preme Court considered whether a deed that purported to convey a
"right of way" to a railroad company conveyed a fee simple interest or
merely an easement.2 The trial court concluded that the grant only con-
1. 13 Cal. 4th 232, 914 P.2d 160, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 82 (1996). Justice Arabian, retired
Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, assigned by the Chairperson of the
Judicial Council, wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice Lucas and Justices
Baxter and George joined. Id at 235-50, 914 P.2d at 162-72, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-94.
Justice Mosk wrote a separate opinion concurring and dissenting. Id. at 250-67, 914
P.2d at 172-83, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94-105.(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). Justice
Kennard wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justice Werdegar joined. Id. at 267-68,
914 P.2d at 183-84, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 235-50, 914 P.2d at 162-72, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-94. In City of Manhattan
Beach, the Redondo Land Company [hereinafter RLC] acquired 4500 acres in Manhattan
Beach from an 1887 deed. Id. at 235, 914 P.2d at 162, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84. In 1888,
the RLC, predecessor in interest to all but two real parties in interest Ihereinafter the
heirs], conveyed a strip of property to the Redondo Beach Railway Company, predeces-
sor in interest to the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company [hereinafter
Santa Fe]. Id. at 235-36, 914 P.2d at 162-63, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84-85. At issue in the
dispute is the nature of the interest that was conveyed by the. RLC-to-Railway deed. Id.
at 236, 914 P.2d at 163, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. The deed provided, in pertinent part,
that the RLC, "'for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar' 'remise[d], release[d]
and quit-claim[ed]' to the railway 'the right of way for the construction, maintenance
and operation of a Steam Railroad, upon[,] over and along'" the subject property. Id.
The RLC also reserved a portion of the property from the grant for the maintenance,
of a warehouse. Id, In addition the grant contained three conditions requiring the
grantee to: (1) maintain a side track to provide a freight station; (2) provide a mini-
mum number of railroad crossings to allow full use and enjoyment of the remaining
land; and (3) provide culverts and drainage to prevent flooding of the remaining land.
Id, The grant provided for a reversion to the grantors and their successors in interest
if the grantee failed to satisfy the conditions. Id. The habendum clause of the deed
provided: "To have and to hold all and singular the rights aforesaid unto [the railway]
and its assigns and successors forever, subject however to and upon the terms and
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veyed an easement, which terminated when Santa Fe Railway Company
discontinued railway activities.' After the court of appeal denied review,
the supreme court issued an alternative writ and transferred the case to
the court of appeal.4 The court of appeal held that the deed itself con-
veyed only an easement and that extrinsic evidence supported that con-
clusion.5 Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that the
deed conveyed a fee interest, but based its conclusion on extrinsic evi-
dence necessary to interpret the deed.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
Justice Arabian, writing for the majority, began his analysis by address;-
ing the principles of law governing the interpretation of deeds and the
propriety of an appellate court's review of a lower court's interpretation
of a deed.7 The court stated that the primary objective of interpreting a
deed is to fulfill the intent of the parties and that a court should only
conditions aforesaid." Id. at 236-37, 914 P.2d at 163, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. In 1897,
the RLC, the railway, and one Parvin Wright, who held an option on 463 acres of the
RLC's land, signed an indenture that abrogated the reversionary conditions of the origi-
nal deed as long as a certain station was maintained. Id, at 237, 914 P.2d at 163, 52
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85. There was no reverter provision in the new condition. Id.
During the following fifteen years, the RLC disposed of all remaining land, culmi-
nating in corporate dissolution proceedings which concluded that "'all of the property
of said corporation has been disposed of." Id. Railway activity continued until 1982,
when all rail activity ended. Id. Steven R. Wild, A History of Railroad Abandonments,
23 TRANSP. U. 1 (1995) (discussing termination of a railroad's use of an easement). In
1982, Santa Fe leased the property to the City of Manhattan Beach [hereinafter the
City], then sold it to the City in 1986. Cit of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 2:37,
914 P.2d at 163, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 85.
In 1987, the heirs filed suit against the City and Santa Fe, alleging that the aban-
donment of railway activities entitled the heirs to exercise their powers of termination.
Id. The heirs also sought to quiet title and recover damages for inverse condemnation.
Id.
3. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 237, 914 P.2d at 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 86. The trial court also found Santa Fe and the City liable for inverse condemna-
tion. Id. For a discussion of alternative uses of discontinued railroad rights of way, see
generally Thomas A. Duda, Comment, The Use of Discontinued Railroad Rights-of-Way
as Recreational Hiking and Biking Trails: Does the National 7rils System Act Sanc-
tion Takings?, 33 ST. LouIs U. U. 205 (1988).
4. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 238, 914 P.2d at 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 86.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 235, 914 P.2d at 162, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 84.
7. Id. at 238, 914 P.2d at 164, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86.
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examine extrinsic evidence to give meaning to the instrument.' The
court further stated that interpretation is a judicial function and an ap-
pellate court is not bound by a lower court's findings unless the lower
court's interpretation relied on the credibility of the extrinsic evidence
Because the lower court's conclusion in City of Manhattan Beach was
not based on the credibility of the extrinsic evidence, the supreme court
concluded that it was not bound by the lower court's interpretation.0
The court began its interpretation by examining the terms of the
deed." The court discussed several general and statutory rules of con-
struction in favor of concluding that the deed conveyed a fee interest. 2
First, the words "remise, release and quitclaim" as used in the deed are
commonly used in a quitclaim deed; quitclaim deeds are deeds that trans-
fer whatever interest the grantor may have in the property. 3 Second,
the law presumes a grant of fee simple unless the grant shows the intent
to convey a lesser estate. 4 Third, when two parts of a deed conflict, the
former prevails." Fourth, the term "right of way" is less definite than
the term "quitclaim," and doubtful clauses are construed against the
grantor.6 Fifth, the use of a legal description and a reservation of a por-
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. See generally 4 B.E. WrrIaN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Rea Property
§ 235 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the applicability of contract law to deed
interpretation); Bruce M. Kramer, The Sisyphean Task of Interpreting Mineral Deeds
and Leases: An Encyclopedia of Canons of Construction, 24 TEx. TECH. L REV. 1
(1993) (discussing general rules of deed interpretation).
12. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 238-45, 914 P.2d at 164-69, 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 86-91.
13. Id. at 239, 914 P.2d at 164-65, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-87. Because the RLC
owned the property in fee simple, the quitclaim deed would convey a fee simple. Id.
See generally 4 B.E. WrMN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Real Property § 135 (9th ed.
1987 & Supp. 1996) (discussing conveyances by quitclaim deeds).
14. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 242, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 89; see also CAL CIv. CODE § 1105 (West 1996). See generally 53 CAL JuR. 3D Rail-
roads §§ 59, 61 (1979 & Supp. 1996) (discussing property rights and distinguishing a
fee interest from an easement).
15. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 242, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 89; see also CAL. Cir. CODE § 1070 (West 1996). Because the quitclaim preceded the
right of way terminology, this would favor the conveyance of a fee interest City of
Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 242-43, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89.
16. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 242-43, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 89.
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tion of the property indicate the intent to convey a fee.17 Sixth, condi-
tions in the deed whose violation would result in reversion to the grant-
ors indicated the grantor intended to convey a fee, because an easement
does not revert, but rather terminates upon violation of the deed's condi-
tions. 8 Finally, because the mortgagee and two officers of the RLC
signed the deed, it is likely the grantors intended to convey a fee inter-
est. 9
The court discussed several factors that would militate a finding that
the deed intended to convey an easement.2" First, the deed made multi-
ple references to a "right of way," and contained a general presumption
that a right of way granted to a railroad only conveys an easement.
Second, contrary to the statutory presumption of a fee, the use of right
of way indicates the intent to convey a lesser interest.' Third, the
deed's description of the right of way as "upon[,I over and along" the
property of the grantor is akin to an easement appurtenant.3 Fourth,
the nominal consideration received by the RLC indicated an easement.'
The court also examined the purpose and habendum clauses of the
deed and concluded that neither was dispositive in illustrating the
parties' intent.' After examining the four comers of the deed, the court
held that the deed appeared to convey a fee simple and an easement
simultaneously, and that an examination of extrinsic evidence was neces-
sary to illuminate the parties' intent.28
17. Id. at 244, 914 P.2d at 168, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90.
18. Id. at 244, 914 P.2d at 168-69, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 90-91. See generally Frona
Powell, Defeasible Fees and the Nature of Real Property, 40 U. KAN. L REv. 411 (1992)
(discussing interests in land).
19. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 245, 914 P.2d at 169, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 91.
20. Id. at 238-46, 914 P.2d at 164-69, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 86-91.
21. Id. at 240-41, 914 P.2d at 165-66, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 87-88. See generally 53 CAL
JuR. 3D Railroads § 69 (1979) (discussing the presumption of an easement in convey-
ances to railroads).
22. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 243, 914 P.2d at 167, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 89; see also CAL. CIv. CODE § 801.7 (West 1982 & Supp. 1997).
23. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 244, 914 P.2d at 168, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 90 (alteration in original).
24. Id. at 245, 914 P.2d at 169, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. The court did recognize,
however, that the RLC could have anticipated a benefit from the railway's presence,
thus minimizing the importance of actual consideration. Id.
25. Id. at 243-45, 914 P.2d at 167-69, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 89-91.
26. Id. at 245-46, 914 P.2d at 169, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 91. See generally Kristi Rob-
bins Rezabek, Comment, Property Law-Buld v. US Sprint Communications Co.: As-
certaining the Rights of Fee Owners on Whose Land a Railroad Easement Exists, 22
MEMPHiS ST. U. L REv. 843 (1992) (discussing a Tennessee court's analysis of a scenar-
io similar to City of Manhattan Beach).
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The court discussed several subsequent actions by the RLC that indi-
cated that the deed conveyed a fee.27 First, the 1888 conveyance to
Parvin Wright modifying the reversionary conditions stated that the earli-
er "deed shall remain a grant as therein expressed."' Second, when
contemplating disposal of its remaining property by partition, the RLC
excluded the railway property, indicating that the RLC already consid-
ered it disposed.' Third, in a quiet title action resulting from the parti-
tion, the RLC, in court documents, specifically excepted the railway
property from the proceedings, referring to it as "being the lands con-
veyed [to the railway] by the [1888 deed]."' Fourth, the RLC's decree of
dissolution stated that all property had been distributed to its sharehold-
ers except the railway property, indicating that the RLC already consid-
ered it disposed.3 Finally, Manhattan Beach was only accessible by
train, therefore, it was in the RLC's interest, as a land developer, to im-
prove access to the land it speculatively purchased, a purpose best
served by granting an absolute interest to the railway.' Additionally, the
heirs argued that Santa Fe was bound by representations made during
tax assessment litigation and Interstate Commerce Commission hearings,
but the court concluded that a legal conclusion made decades later is not
compelling evidence of the parties' intent.' Using extrinsic evidence,
the court held that the RLC believed it had already conveyed a fee.'
B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk concurred with the majority's conclusion that the deed
indicated a conveyance of an easement, but dissented on the conclusion
that the deed also conveyed a fee interest.' Justice Mosk argued that
the intent of the parties could be discerned from examining the deed
exclusively and warned that a liberal policy of utilizing extrinsic evidence
27. City of Manhattan Beach, 13 Cal. 4th at 246-49, 914 P.2d at 169-72, 52 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 91-94.
28. Id. at 246, 914 P.2d at 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92 (emphasis in original).
29. Id.
30. Id. at 247, 914 P.2d at 170, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 92 (alteration in original).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 248, 914 P.2d at 171, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93.
33. Id. at 249, 914 P.2d at 171-72, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 93-94.
34. Id. at 249-50, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
35. Id. at 250, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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would undermine reliance on recorded documents.' Justice Mosk criti-
cized the majority for "plac[ing] undue emphasis on certain other lan-
guage in the deed."37 First, Justice Mosk stated that a quitclaim deed
can be used to convey an easement as well as a fee.' Second, the use
of a legal description in the deed is appropriate with an easement be-
cause it must be fixed to the land.' Third, the majority emphasized that
reverter clauses are only used when conveying fee interests, however,
Justice Mosk stated that "reverter" was commonly misused when drafting
a railroad right of way.4" Justice Mosk argued that the trial court's ex-
amination of extrinsic evidence, which supported a finding of an ease-
ment, should not be disturbed.4 Justice Mosk also disagreed with hold-
ing Santa Fe liable, along with the City, for inverse condemnation, argu-
ing that Santa Fe was not an active joint participant in the taking.42
C. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard agreed with Justice Mosk's conclusion that the deed
conveyed only an easement, but argued that Santa Fe should be held
liable for inverse condemnation because Santa Fe was a joint participant
in the taking.43
III. IMPACT AND CONCLUSION
The impact of City of Manhattan Beach will be decidedly minimal.
The majority even stated, "In reaching our conclusion, we emphasize that
the peculiar facts of this case dictate the narrow, perhaps unique, basis
of our holding." 4 Therefore, it seems that the greatest impact is the
court's willingness to introduce extrinsic evidence to illuminate the
36. Id. at 253, 914 P.2d at 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
37. Id. at 256, 914 P.2d at 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
38. Id. at 256-57, 914 P.2d at 176, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 98 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
39. Id. at 258, 914 P.2d at 177, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 99 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
40. Id. at 260, 914 P.2d at 178-79, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 100-01 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
41. Id. at 262-63, 914 P.2d at 180, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 102 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
42. Id. at 265-67, 914 P.2d at 182-83, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 104-05 (Mosk, J., concurring
and dissenting).
43. Id at 267-68, 914 P.2d at 183-84, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 105-06 (Kennard, J., dissent-
ing).
44. Id. at 249-50, 914 P.2d at 172, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 94.
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parties' intent to a deed and the potential for this extrinsic evidence to
undermine the effectiveness of recorded instruments.46
PAuL A. ROSE
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45. Id. at 253, 914 P.2d at 174, 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 96 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
IV. DELINQUENT, DEPENDENT AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN
A juvenile court, when terminating its dependency juris-
diction, may issue an order conditioning visitation on a
parent's participation in counseling to minimize poten-
tial dangers of the same risk of physical abuse or emo-
tional harm that previously led to the dependency adju-
dication. In doing so, the juvenile court is not bound by
the requirements of Family Code section 3190:
In re Chantal S.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Chantal S., the California Supreme Court considered whether
a juvenile court could issue an order conditioning visitation on a parent's
participation in counseling when terminating its dependency jurisdic-
tion.2 Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme court
held that the juvenile court retained jurisdiction to place conditions upon
a parent's visitation rights based upon policy considerations that the
1. 13 Cal. 4th 196, 913 P.2d 1075, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (1996). In this decision,
Chief Justice Lucas delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices Kennard, Baxter,
George, Werdegar, and Chin concurred. Id, at 200-15, 913 P.2d at 1078-87, 51 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 868-78. Justice Mosk wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion. Id. at 215-16,
913 P.2d at 1087-88, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878-79 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
2. Id. at 200-15, 913 P.2d at 1078-87, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868-78. Chantal was ad-
judged a dependent child of the juvenile court based on findings that her father acted
violently towards her. Id. at 201, 913 P.2d at 1078, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. The juve-
nile court ordered counseling for Chantal. Id. Shortly after the dependency order,
Chantal's father was sentenced to three years in prison for unrelated charges. Id. While
the father was still in prison, the social worker assigned to the case recommended
that dependency be terminated and Chantal's mother be awarded sole custody because
Chantal was no longer in need of the court's protection and her mother complied with
the "service plan" devised for her by the Department of Social Services. Id. at 201-02,
913 P.2d at 1078, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. Chantal's father objected to terminating the
juvenile court's jurisdiction, but the court nonetheless granted custody of Chantal to
her mother and announced that the court would terminate dependency after an order
was prepared containing specific conditions for visitation rights. Id. at 202, 913 P.2d at
1078-79, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869. Such an order was prepared, specifying that Chantal's
father must regularly attend psychotherapy and sign a release of information to
Chantal's therapist regarding his progress before he could visit his daughter. Id. at 202,
913 P.2d at 1079, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 869-70. Once satisfactory progress had been
made, he would be permitted to visit Chantal in her therapist's office. Id. at 202, 913
P.2d at 1079, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870. Chantal's father appealed from the custody order,
claiming that the juvenile court could not require him to submit to counseling as a
condition of visitation and that the order unlawfully delegated judicial authority to
therapists. Id. The court of appeal rejected these assertions, and affirmed the order. Id
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juvenile court retains a duty to consider the best interests of a child and
to protect that child from the abuse or neglect which previously led to
the dependency adjudication.3
Il. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. A juvenile court has the authority to require counseling as a
condition of visitation.
Chief Justice Lucas, writing for the majority, addressed whether Cal-
fornia Welfare & Institutions Code sections 362.44 and 362(c)' apply to
juvenile courts following termination of dependency jurisdiction. The
court began its analysis by overruling the holding in Katerine M.7 and
then stated that section 362.4 expressly authorizes the court to make
custody and visitation orders, and therefore, implicitly authorizes the
3. Id. at 202-15, 913 P.2d at 1079-87, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-78. See 10 B.E. WmraN,
SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 104 (9th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing relevant factors the court must consider in determining the best interests of
the child); V. Pualani Enos, Recent Development- Prosecuting Battered Mothers: State
Laws' Failure to Protect Battered Women and Abused Children, 19 HARv. WOMEN'S U.
229 (1996) (discussing family violence and public policy concerns regarding abused
women and children). "We, as a society, can justify removing children from their abu-
sive parent when the dangers that parent poses outweigh the benefits the children re-
ceive by remaining with the natural parent" Id. at 231.
4. Section 362.4 states: "When the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child of the juvenile court ... the juvenile
court on its own motion, may issue .. . an order determining the custody of, or visita-
tion with, the child." CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 362.4 (West Supp. 1997).
5. Section 362(c) states, in pertinent part:
The juvenile court may direct any and all reasonable orders to the par-
ents ... of the minor who is the subject of any proceedings under this
chapter.... Such an order may include a direction to participate in a
counseling... program .... The program in which a parent... is re-
quired to participate shall be designed to eliminate those conditions that led
to the court's finding that the minor is a person described by Section 300.
CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 362(c) (West Supp. 1997).
6. Chantal, 13 Cal. 4th at 202-04, 913 P.2d at 1079-80, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870-71.
7. In re Katherine M., 27 Cal. App. 4th 91, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (1994) (holding a
juvenile court may not require a parent to submit to counseling as a condition of cus-
tody once the court terminates its dependency jurisdiction), overruled by In re Chantal
S., 13 Cal. 4th 196, 913 P.2d 1075, 51 Cal. Rtpr. 2d 876 (1996).
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court to make collateral orders, such as counseling orders, that are rea-
sonably related to the custody and visitation orders.8 The court further
held that section 362(c) remains applicable when a juvenile court termi-
nates dependency jurisdiction.9 Moreover, the court reasoned that the
termination of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily indicate that
the conditions which led to the dependency order have disappeared."°
The juvenile court may therefore decide that continued supervision of
the minor as a dependent child is not necessary for the child's protec-
tion, yet order conditions on visitation to minimize or eliminate any pos-
sible danger to the minor."
2. Family Code section 3190 does not apply to juvenile court orders.
Next, the court concluded that Family Code section 319012 does not
apply to dependency proceedings in the juvenile court. 3 The court rea-
soned that the application of a family law presumption that joint custody
is in the best interest of the child is inconsistent with the purpose of
juvenile court law. 4 In juvenile dependency proceedings, the child is
involved in the court proceedings because he or she has been abused or
neglected. 5 Therefore, the parents' ability to protect and care for the
child is the central issue, and the juvenile court is best situated to make
custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without
any presumptions that joint custody is in the child's best interest.
8. Chantal, 13 Cal. 4th at 203-04, 913 P.2d at 1079-80, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 870.
9. Id. at 204, 913 P.2d at 1080, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871.
10. Id.
11. Id. See generally 33 CAL Jun. 3D Family Law § 945 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing permissible restrictions a court may place on a parent's visitation rights); Joel
E. Smith, Annotation, Right to Require Psychiatric or Mental Examination for Party
Seeking to Obtain or Retain Custody of Child, 99 A.LR. 3D 268 (1995 & Supp. 1996)
(discussing psychiatric or mental examinations as conditions for a parent seeking custo-
dy of his or her child).
12. Family Code section 3190 states in pertinent part that the family court may.
require parents involved in a custody or visitation dispute, and the minor
child, to participate in outpatient counseling with a licensed mental health
professional . . . for not more than one year ... if the court finds both of
the following: (1) The dispute between the parents or between a parent and
child poses a substantial danger to the best interest of the child. (2) The
counseling is in the best interest of the child.
CAL FAM. CODE § 3190 (West Supp. 1997).
13. Chanta, 13 Cal. 4th at 205-08, 913 P.2d at 1081-83, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 871-74.
14. Id. at 206, 913 P.2d at 1082, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872; see also 33 CAL Jun. 3D
Family Law § 900 (discussing the public policies in custody disputes).
15. Chanta, 13 Cal. 4th at 207-08, 913 P.2d at 1082, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 873.
16. Id. at 206, 913 P.2d at 1082, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872.
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Further, the court asserted that the legislature has expressly provided
that specific parts of the Family Code apply to orders issued by the juve-
nile court.'7 Therefore, the court held that the legislature's failure to ex-
pressly apply Family Code section 3190 to the juvenile court reveals a
lack of legislative intent to apply that section to juvenile court proceed-
imgs.
18
3. The court order did not constitute an improper delegation of
judicial authority.
The final issues addressed by the court were whether the order im-
properly delegated authority to the two therapists by specifying that
visitation be "facilitated" by Chantal's therapist, and whether the deter-
mnation of "satisfactory progress" must be made by the father's thera-
pist before visitation may occur.'9 The court began by stating that an
order may not delegate to therapists absolute discretion to determine
whether visitation should occur.0 The court reasoned that the order in
the instant case did not vest therapists with absolute discretion.2 ' Rath-
er, the order vested the therapists with some discretion to determine
when satisfactory progress has been made and the ordered visitation
may begin.' Furthermore, the court stated that the juvenile court reject-
ed the course of denying visitation altogether and instead opted for the
restrictive order, which in essence amounted to a windfall gain for the
father, and thus was not a violation of his rights.'
17. Id.
18. Id. at 206-07, 913 P.2d at 1082, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 872-73. The court further
rejected the father's claim that Family Code section 3190 should apply on due process
grounds. Id. at 211-13, 913 P.2d at 1085-86, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 875-77. The court stated
that the juvenile court affords procedural protections which will continue to apply once
the case is transferred to family court. Id.
19. Id. at 213-14, 913 P.2d at 1086-87, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877-78.
20. Id. at 213, 913 P.2d at 1086, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877. See 10 B.E. WrrIaN, SUMMA-
RY OF CAaIFoR i- LAW, Parent and Child § 92 (9th ed. 1995) (discussing involuntary
psychiatric therapy for an indefinite period of time); see also In re Marriage of
Matthews, 101 Cal. App. 3d 811, 161 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1980) (holding that a court is not
empowered to order a parent to undergo involuntary psychiatric therapy for an indefi-
nite period of time).
21. Chantat, 13 Cal. 4th at 213, 913 P.2d at 1086, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 213-14, 913 P.2d at 1087, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 877-78. For a general discus-
sion on the creation and termination of the parent-child relationship, see 59 AM. JUR.
2D Parent and Child § 7 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing the legal parameters of the parent-
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B. Justice Mosk's Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
Justice Mosk's separate opinion concurred with the majority's judg-
ment, but disagreed with the majority's holding regarding the delegation
of authority to therapists. 2' Justice Mosk argued that the visitation order
unlawfully delegated judicial authority to individuals outside the govern-
ment by granting substantially unfettered discretion to private psycho-
therapists.25 Based on this rationale, Justice Mosk argued that the court
of appeal committed reversible error in affirming the juvenile court's
visitation order.26
Ill. IMPACT
Prior to Chantal, the California Supreme Court held that a juvenile
court could not require a parent to submit to counseling as a condition
of custody once the court terminated its dependency jurisdiction.' The
holding in Chantal, however, reflects recent trends in California law con-
cerning the best interests of an abused or neglected child' and stands
for the proposition that the judicial system must carefully consider the
best interests of a child, while recognizing the child's need for a relation-
ship with his or her biological parents.' While the trend is to put more
weight on the best interests of children, the holding in Chanta/ balances
these two considerations by imposing conditions upon an abusive parent
that reasonably relate to visitation and the protection of the abused
child relationship).
24. Chantal, 13 Cal. 4th at 215-16, 913 P.2d at 1087-88, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878-79
(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
25. Id. at 215, 913 P.2d at 1087-88, 51 Cal. Rplr. 2d at 878 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
26. Id. at 215, 913 P.2d at 1087, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 878 (Mosk, J., concurring and
dissenting).
27. In re Katherine M., 27 Cal. App. 4th 91, 33 CaL Rptr. 2d 298 (1994), overruled
by In re Chantal S., 13 Cal. 4th 196, 913 P.2d 1075, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 866 (1996).
28. See Darlene Selby, Comment, Recent Trends in California Law Concerning the
Best Interests of the Child, 1 PEPP. L REV. 89 (1973) (discussing California legal trends
concerning the best interests of an abused or neglected child).
29. See generally Michael P. Roche, Article, Childhood and its Environment- The
Implications for Children's Rights, 34 Loy. L REv. 5 (1988). Roche specifically sug-
gests that "both utility and justice can be better served by the adoption of a more
flexible approach to allocating rights to children." Id. at 33; see also Andre P. Derdeyn
et al., Alternatives to Absolute Termination of Parental Rights afler Long-Term Foster
Care, 31 VWD. L REv. 1165 (1978) (discussing the need for flexible child placement al-
ternatives without costing the child exposure to his or her biological family). "While
such parental 'interest' should be accorded less importance than the child's need for
adequate parenting, the adult's assertion of rights in these types of cases is not, by
definition, inimical to the child's welfare." Id. at 1190.
1440
[Vol. 24: 1397, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
child.' As a result, Chantal will likely provide more rights to children in
the courtroom while encouraging alternatives to absolute termination of
parental rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's ruling in Chantal gives the juvenile
court system the opportunity to protect children, even beyond the ter-
mination of their dependency jurisdiction. By allowing the court to place
conditions on abusive parents before visitation may occur, the court will
be able to protect a child's best interests while maintaining the parent-
child relationship.
CHRISTIANE CARGILL
30. For a discussion of the child's best interests, see Christian Reichel Van Deusen,
The Best Interest of the Child and the Law, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 417 (1991) (discussing
the progress and development of children's rights). "It took decades before the judicial
system took cognizance of the fact that a child was entitled to have his or her best
interests protected by a court of law." Id. at 419.
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V. EQUAL PROTECTION
A cause of action exists under former § 1513(d) of the
Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982 when un-
equal treatment under California's facially impartial tax
laws is alleged: American Airlines, Inc. v. San Mateo
County.
I. INTRODUCTION
In American Airlines, Inc. v. San Mateo County,' the California Su-
preme Court determined whether § 1513(d) of the former 49 United
States Code Appendix of the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of
19822 grants a private cause of action and under what circumstances a
plaintiff can use that section as a basis for a claim.3 Reversing the ap-
pellate court's decision, the California Supreme Court held that § 1513(d)
permits a private right of action and further found that the plaintiffs
claim in the instant case was sufficiently based on allegations of unequal
treatment under California tax laws.4 Lastly, the court rejected the ap-
plicability of § 1513(d) on the alternative basis that the assessment ratio
1. 12 Cal. 4th 1110, 912 P.2d 1198, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 251 (1996). Justice Arabian
wrote the majority opinion in which Chief Justice Lucas, Justices Baxter, George,
Mosk, and Werdegar concurred. Id. at 1116-40, 912 P.2d at 1202-18, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
255-71. Justice Kennard authored a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 1140-42, 912
P.2d at 1218-20, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271-72 (Kennard, J., concurring).
2. The statute is currently embodied in 49 U.S.C. § 40116(d). Id. at 1116 n.1, 912
P.2d at 1202 n.1, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255 nl. Former § 1513(d) was in effect during
the contested tax years of 1985-1989. Id.
3. Id. at 1116, 912 P.2d at 1202, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255. American Airlines and
nine other airlines [hereinafter "airlines"] joined against 18 California counties seeking a
declaratory judgment and partial return of funds collected as ad valorem personal
property taxes. Id. at 1117, 912 P.2d at 1203, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 256. The airlines
alleged that their commercial property was taxed at levels equal to or higher than the
true market value of the property, unlike commercial property in other industries
which was taxed at levels below its true market value. Id. at 1118-19, 912 P.2d at
1204, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 257. The trial court granted the counties' motion for summary
judgment, concluding that the method by which airline property was taxed precluded
the airlines from showing a prima facie case of discrimination under former 49 U.S.C.
§ 1513(d) and that the statute disallowed private causes of action. Id. at 1120, 912
P.2d at 1205, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court's
decision. Id.
4. Id. at 1116, 912 P.2d at 1202, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
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for airline personal property is higher than the ratio for railroad per-
sonal property.'
II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Background
The court began by analyzing statutes which prohibit discrimination
against interstate carriers on the basis of taxation.7 Noting the similar
language and intertwining legislative histories of these statutes, the court
stated that the similarities allowed cross-application of cases so that a
case explaining one statute could be used to explain another statute,
with one noteworthy exception.8 In contrast to the other statutes, the
court stated that former § 1513(d) did not except itself out of the general
rule that state tax collections cannot be stopped by federal court action.'
Continuing its preliminary investigation, the court defined the key tax
terms and practices in California."° The court found that aircraft proper-
ty having no primary location is taxed via a formula which approximates
the time such property spends in the state."
5. See 9 B.E. WrrN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Taxation §§ 131-132 (9th ed.
1989 & Supp. 1996) (stating the general rule that "all forms of tangible personal prop-
erty are taxable" but noting that aircraft, depending on whether it is commercial or
private, is taxed under separate statutes).
6. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1116-20, 912 P.2d at 1205, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
255.
7. Id. at 1120-22, 912 P.2d at 1205-06, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 258-59. The three statutes
included the Airport and Airway Improvement Act of 1982, the Railroad Revitalization
and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11503), and the Mothr Carri-
er Act of 1980 (formerly 49 U.S.C. § 11503(a)). Id. For the history, scope, and determi-
nation of discrimination under the statutes, see Scott M. Schoenwald, Note, Discrimi-
natory Demands and Divided Decisions: State and Local Taxation of Rail, Motor, and
Air Carrier Property, 39 VAND. L REV. 1107, 1122-35 (1986).
8. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1122-23, 912 P.2d at 1206-07, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 259-60.
9. Id. at 1124, 912 P.2d at 1207, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260.
10. Id. at 1124, 912 P:2d at 1207-08, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 260-61; see Bonnie H. Keen,
Tax Assessment of Contaminated Property: Tax Breaks for Polluters?, 19 B.C. ENVTL
AFF. L REV. 885, 889-92 (1992) (delineating basic property tax assessment principles).
11. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1124-25, 912 P.2d at 1208, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
261; see Marissa R. Ar-ache, Comment, Factor Representation in the Apportionment of
Income Prom Intangibles, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 485, 485-92 (1996) (tracking different
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Further judicial inquiry revealed that, unlike airline property, railroad
property is taxed on a unitary standard whereby an entire enterprise is
valued as one unit and not as the sum of its assets.'" To determine rail-
road property values, an "income" or "capitalized earnings" approach is
used so that the fair market value of the property is measured by how
much "an investor would be willing to pay for the right to receive the
future income the property is projected to produce." 3
2. Airlines' Claims
a. Former § 1513(d) grants a private right of action.
In deciding whether a federal statute grants a private cause of action,
the court focused on whether Congress meant to create such a cause of
action.4 Examining the language of former § 1513(d) in light of whether
the statute was enacted for a special group, whether Congress wanted to
grant or deny a remedy, whether a private cause of action would further
the statute's underlying policy, and whether the creation of the federal
cause of action would be consistent with other laws, 5 the court con-
cluded that the statute created a private right of action. 6
First, the court stated that § 1513(d) was intended to benefit a partic-
ularized group, namely taxpayers who own airline property, because the
statute protected them from discriminatory taxation.7 Second, the court
found that § 1513(d) indicated legislative intent to create a private cause
of action because its relevant language reiterated the language of the
Motor Carrier Acts and the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Re-
form Act, both of which granted a private remedy. 8 Third, the court
taxing techniques used as businesses grow beyond state borders).
12. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1124-25, 912 P.2d at 1208, 51 Cal., Rptr. 2d at
261.
13. Id. at 1126, 912 P.2d at 1209, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 261-62.
14. Id. at 1128, 912 P.2d at 1210, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263; see Susan J. Stabile, The
Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights
of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 861, 863 (1996) (advocating a retreat from exclusive
reliance on congressional intent in determining whether a private cause of action ex-
ists).
15. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1128, 912 P.2d at 1210, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
263 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); see Nancy Eisenhauer, Implied Causes
of Action Under Federal Statutes: The Air Carriers Access Act of 1986, 59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1183, 1185-93 (1992) (discussing the Supreme Court's transition from Cort's four-
prong test to a two-prong test focusing only on whether the statute creates a federal
right for a specific group of citizens and on the legislative intent behind the statute).
16. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1131, 912 P.2d at 1212, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
265.
17. Id. at 1129, 912 P.2d at 1211, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263-64.
18. Id. at 1129-30, 912 P.2d at 1211, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264. The court stated that
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held a private right to bring suit was a proper implementation of
§ 1513(d) policy. 9 Fourth, the court acknowledged state dominance
over tax laws, but judged the potential burdens on interstate commerce
to warrant federal intervention regarding airline property taxation.20
Based on these factors, the court held that a private cause of action ex-
ists.2 1
b. Airlines have a claim for relief under former § 1513(d).
The airlines argued that they were the victims of de facto discrimina-
tion caused by the nonassessment or underassessment of other commer-
cial and industrial property, in contrast to the full assessment of airline
property to its fair market value.2 The court agreed that the airlines had
stated a proper claim under former § 1513(d) because the airlines were
allegedly being taxed by a higher assessment ratio than other commercial
property in relation to true market values.' In addition, the court pro-
vided guidance to the airlines about how to prove discrimination.'
The court explained that the mere showing that property inadvertently
escaped assessment was insufficient to prove discrimination between
properties.25 To the contrary, the court insisted that the airlines bear the
burden of proving that action or inaction on behalf of the tax assessor26
either disadvantageously targets or disparately affects the Airlines be-
cause it produces "significant amounts of unassessed or underas-
"while Congress did not include an express exemption to the Tax Injunction Act in
former section 1513(d) . . . the fact that the rest of the relevant statutory language is
virtually identical to the Motor Carrier and 4-R Acts indicates that Congress did intend
that judicial redress be available." Id. at 1129-30, 912 P.2d at 1211, 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
263-64.
19. Id. at 1130, 912 P.2d at 1211-12, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.
20. Id. at 1130, 912 P.2d at 1212, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264.
21. Id. at 1131, 912 P.2d at 1212, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265.
22. Id. at 1131-32, 912 P.2d at 1212-13, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265.
23. Id. at 1136, 912 P.2d at 1215, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268; see 51 CAL JuR. 3D Prop-
erty Taxes § 51 (1979 & Supp. 1996) (confirming that "all property subject to general
property taxation [be taxed] at 100 percent of its full value").
24. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1132-36, 912 P.2d at 1213-16, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 265-68.
25. Id. at 1133-34, 912 P.2d at 1214, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266-67.
26. See 51 CAL JuP. 3D Property Taxes § 49 (1979 & Supp. 1996) (stating that as-
sessors are not normally liable for simple errors or misjudgments and that only gross
negligence or corruption would give rise to personal liability for damages).
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sessed... commercial and industrial personal property."27 The level of
disparity the airlines would have to prove, however, was left uncertain
because former § 1513(d) set no minimum amount.28 Other statutes had
required at least a 5% disparity.' Because the airlines asserted a 15%
disparity, the court did not have to resolve whether former § 1513(d)
required proof of only a de minimus disparity or a disparity of at least
59&3
0
As its second basis of relief, the airlines contended that airline prop-
erty is comparable to railroad property. The airlines argued that because
railroad property is taxed at only 7096 of its fair market value, while air-
line property is taxed at 100% of its fair market value, discrimination
exists under former § 1513(d). 3' The court rejected this assertion, find-
ing railroad property to be transportation property which the statute
excluded from the definition of comparable commercial and industrial
property.
B. Justice Kennard's Concurring Opinion
Justice Kennard wrote separately to express concern with the airlines'
requested remedy of a refund.' Because underassessed property is re-
quired to be retroactively assessed and because federal laws do not re-
quire that refunds be made, Justice Kennard concluded that the proper
discrimination remedy would be to first let the government reclaim the
amounts it would have received under a proper assessment before any
refund claims are allowed.'
27. American Airlines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1135, 912 P.2d at 1215, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
267.
28. Id, at 1135, 912 P.2d at 1215, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1136, 912 P.2d at 1215, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
31. Id. at 1136, 912 P.2d at 1216, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 268.
32. Id. at 1139, 912 P.2d at 1218, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 270. Former § 1513(d)(2)(D)
defined commercial and industrial property as "property, other than transportation prop-
erty and land used primarily for agricultural purposes or timber growing, devoted to a
commercial or industrial use and subject to a property tax levy." Id. at 1137, 912 P.2d
at 1216, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269.
33. Id. at 1141-41, 912 P.2d at 1219, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 271 (Kennard, J., concur-
ring).
34. Id. (Kennard, J., concurring); see 9 B.E. WrrmN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,
Taxation § 238 (9th ed. 1989 & Supp. 1996) (listing the grounds upon which a taxpay-
er can file a claim for a tax refund after it has been paid).
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Ill. IMPACT
An important consequence of the court's decision is that former
§ 1513(d) allows taxpayers to avail themselves of an opportunity to sue
when the rate of ad valorem property taxes on air transportation proper-
ty is higher than the tax rate applied to other commercial and industrial
property.' In light of Justice Kennard's concurring opinion questioning
the right to a refund, the remedy ultimately afforded may not be the
taxpayer's most desired remedy.
After stating that a private cause of action exists, the scope of the
decision appears limited by both the statute's demise and the range of
taxpayers who may utilize the court's holding because owners of com-
mercial aircraft property are affected. In addition, those who can prop-
erly bring suit may choose to do so only with caution, considering the
court's warnings that the taxpayer bears the burden of proving a practice
or policy that either disadvantageously targets or disparately affects the
taxpayer because it produces a substantial amount of untaxed commer-
cial and industrial property.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In American Airlines, Inc. v. San Mateo County, the California Su-
preme Court declared former § 1513(d) of the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Act of 1982 to grant a private cause of action.37 The court
permitted a suit by aircraft owners alleging discrimination by the higher
rate of assessment for aircraft versus other commercial property when
the suit is not premised on a comparison with railroad property.'
TERRI SCHALLENKAMP
35. American Airtines, 12 Cal. 4th at 1131, 912 P.2d at 1212, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
265.
36. Id. at 1135, 912 P.2d at 1215, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 267.
37. Id. at 1116, 912 P.2d at 1202, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 255.
38. Id.
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VI. JUVENILE COURT LAW
Anders v. California, which requires compliance with
certain procedures before a court will permit appointed
counsel to withdraw from a case, is not applicable to an
indigent parent's appeal from judgment affecting the
custody of a child or terminating parental rights:
In re Sade C.
I. INTRODUCTION
In In re Sade C.,' the California Supreme Court addressed whether
Anders v. California2 extends to "an indigent parent's appeal from a
judgment or order... adversely affecting his custody of a child or his
status as the child's parent."3 The court of appeal decided that Anders
1. 13 Cal. 4th 952, 920 P.2d 716, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 771 (1996). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion, in which Chief Justice George, and Justices Baxter, Werdegar,
Chin, and Brown concurred. Id. at 959-95, 920 P.2d at 718-42, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773-
97. Justice Kennard filed her own dissenting opinion. Id. at 995-1000, 920 P.2d at 742-
45, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
2. 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Anders has been the subject of several law review articles.
See, e.g., Henry Gabriel & Kimber L Tuttle, Duties of the Court Appointed Attorney,
27 Ta.x TECH L REv. 429, 442-48 (1996) (discussing the requirements of the Anders
brief); Martha C. Warner, Anders in the Fty States: Some Appellants' Equal Protec-
tion Is More Equal than Others', 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625 (1996) (discussing Anders
as it relates to indigent defendants); Eduardo 1. Sanchez, Note, The Right to Counsel
and Frivolous Appeals: Assistance to the Court or Advocacy for the Indigent Ch-
ent-Which is the Real McCoy?, 43 U. MLAM L. Rav. 921 (1989) (discussing Anders
requirements in relation to frivolous lawsuits by indigents); Jack M. Bains, Comment,
Termination of the Attorney-Client Relationship: How Far Must Anders Compliance
Go?: A Survey of Decisions, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 229 (1991) (discussing Anders applica-
tion to indigent defendants).
3. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 959, 920 P.2d at 718, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. In Sade C.,
the court consolidated two juvenile cases for appeal. Id. In the first case, the Depart-
ment of Children's Services (DCS) sought to remove Sade C. from the custody of her
parents, Lakeisha C. and Gregory C. Id. at 960, 920 P.2d at 718-19, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
773-74. DCS alleged that "Sade had suffered, or faced a substantial risk that she would
suffer, serious physical harm or illness as a result of her parent's failure or inability to
furnish adequate supervision or protection, or their inability to provide regular care,
because of substance abuse." Id. at 960, 920 P.2d at 718, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 773. Both
of Sade's parents had a history of substance abuse and criminal activity. Id. at 960,
920 P.2d at 719, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774. At the first appearance, the juvenile court
declared the child a dependant and placed Sade in the custody of Bernice White,
Lakeisha's aunt. Id. Sade's parents ignored family reunification services which were
offered by the court. Id. at 961, 920 P.2d at 719, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774. See generally
27 CAL Ju. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 176 (1987 & Supp. 1996) (dis-
cussing family reunification services). Subsequently, White sought to adopt Sade and
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did not extend to juvenile proceedings.4 On rehearing, the court of ap-
peal affirmed this decision, deciding that it was not required to under-
take an independent review5 of the lower court record for appealable
issues.' The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeal, holding that Anders "prophylactic" procedures for situations
when appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw from a case do not
extend to indigent parents' appeals from judgments obtained by the state,
when such judgments adversely affect their custody of a child or status
as a child's parent.7
terminate all parental rights of Lakeisha and Gregory. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 961, 920
P.2d at 719, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774. Gregory appeared to challenge the order of termi-
nation, and the court appointed counsel. Id. Counsel sought to withdraw, filed a brief,
and requested independent review of the record by the court Id. at 961-62, 920 P.2d
at 719-20, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 774-75.
In the second case, the petition filed by DCS alleged that one Vanessa R. had
been physically and emotionally harmed by her parents inability to adequately supervise
and protect her. Id. at 962, 920 P.2d at 720, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775. Vanessa was
removed from her parents, Kris M. and Edward R., after an emergency room physician
reported potential child abuse. Id. at 963, 920 P.2d at 720, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 775. The
parties agreed to place the child with Kris' mother and stepfather and to participate in
family reunification services. Id. at 963, 920 P.2d at 720-21, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 7-76.
The juvenile court found in favor of the DCS allegations of child abuse and cruelty
and removed the child for placement by DCS. Id. All other terms of the agreement
were followed. Id. Both Kris and Edward appealed the decision of the juvenile court,
and separate counsel was provided. Id. at 964, 920 P.2d at 721, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
776. Both counsel filed briefs requesting withdrawal from the case and independent
review by the appellate court for potential grounds for appeal. Id. at 964-65, 920 P.2d
at 721-22, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776-77.
4. Id. at 965, 920 P.2d at 722, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777.
5. For a discussion on independent review in California, see J. Clark Kelso, A Re-
port on the California Appe/ate System, 45 HASTINGS U. 433, 468-71 (1994).
6. Sade C, 13 Cal. 4th at 964-65, 920 P.2d at 721-22, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 776-77.
7. Id. at 984, 920 P.2d at 734, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
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II. TREATMENT
A. Majority Opinion
1. Historical Background
Justice Mosk, writing for the court in Sade C., began the majority opin-
ion with an in-depth review of the law surrounding the Anders decision'
and then made three conclusions based on this analysis.9
First, the court set forth the procedural requirements of Anders.'"
Second, the court stated that the Anders decision is limited to an indi-
gent criminal defendant's first appeal as of right." The majority referred
to Pennsylvania v. Finley2 and Austin v. United States3 which estab-
lished that Anders does not apply to collateral appeals or discretionary
review of a defendant's case.'4 Third, the court stated that an indigent
criminal defendant has an actual right to effective representation by
8. Id. at 965-77, 920 P.2d at 722-30, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 777-85.
9. Id. at 977-79, 920 P.2d at 730-31, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785-86.
10. Id. at 977-78, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785. In order for appointed
counsel to withdraw, counsel must first submit an Anders brief to the appellate court.
Id. at 977, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 785. Second, the defendant must be
provided with a copy of the brief in order to raise additional arguments. Id. Third, the
appellate court must conduct a review of the record to determine whether the case
has merit. Id. Finally, the court must decide whether to grant the motion for with-
drawal or decide the case on the merits. Id. If the court decides the case on the mer-
its, the defendant is entitled to representation of counsel. Id. The court must either
deny the withdrawal request or grant the request and provide for a replacement Id. at
977-78, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
11. Id. at 978, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
12. 481 U.S. 551 (1987). In Finley, the United States Supreme Court limited the ap-
plication of Anders to "an indigent criminal defendant in his first appeal as of right."
Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 972, 920 P.2d at 726, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 781 (citing Finley, 481
U.S. at 555). The right to counsel, established by previous cases,, does not extend be-
yond the defendant's first appeal, and thus Anders does not extend to collateral ap-
peals. Id. at 972-73, 920 P.2d at 727, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782 (citing Finley, 481 U.S. at
555). i
13. 115 S. Ct. 380, 381 (1994) (declining to extend Anders to situations in which an
appeal is merely discretionary).
14. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 978, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
1450
[Vol. 24: 1397, 1997] California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
counsel," citing Finley,16 Evitts v. Lucey, 7 McCoy v. Court of Appeals
of Wisconsin,8 and Penson v. Ohio9 to support its conclusion.
The court summarized by stating that Anders was formulated to "pro-
tect an indigent criminal defendant's right.., to the assistance of ap-
pellate counsel appointed by the state in his first appeal as of right,"'
as established in Finley, Jones v. Barnes,"' Evitts, McCoy, and
Penson.' Therefore, a court should only permit counsel to withdraw in
the event that the "appeal lacks any basis in law or fact."2'
The California Supreme Court then discussed two additional California
cases decided after Anders.2' First, People v. Feggans25 furthered the
15. Id. at 978, 920 P.2d at 730-31, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785-86.
16. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
17. 469 U.S. 387 (1985). In Evitts, the United States Supreme Court, basing its deci-
sion on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that "a criminal
defendant ... has a right to the effective assistance of counsel in his first appeal as
of right" Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 970-71, 920 P.2d at 725-26, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780-81
(quoting Evitts, 469 U.S. at 404).
18. 486 U.S. 429 (1988). In McCoy, the United States Supreme Court addressed
whether a state could require the inclusion of a n6-merit statement in an Anders brief.
Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 974, 920 P.2d at 727-28, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 782-83 (citing Mc-
Coy, 486 U.S. at 430). The Court upheld this type of state requirement on the premise
that the statement only furthers the purpose of Anders, to determine whether or not
the appeal is frivolous. Id. at 974, 920 P.2d at 728, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 783 (citing Mc-
Coy, 486 U.S. at 439).
19. 488 U.S. 75 (1988). In Penson, the United States Supreme Court found that the
lower court erred when it allowed counsel to withdraw prior to completing an inde-
pendent review of the record. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 976, 920 P.2d at 729, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 784 (citing Penson, 488 U.S. at 82). Furthermore, by not filing an Anders
brief, counsel failed to point out areas which could be the possible basis of appeal. Id.
Mary R True, Note, The Constitutional Basis of the Indigent Appellant's Right to
Appointed Counse" Penson v. Ohio, 58 U. CiN. L. REV. 1137 (1990) (discussing re-
quirements of an Anders brief).
20. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 978, 920 P.2d at 730, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786.
21. 463 U.S. 745 (1983). In Jones, the United States Supreme Court concluded that
there is no duty under the Constitution for appointed counsel to "raise every
nonfrivolous issue requested by the defendant." Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 970, 920 P.2d at
725, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 780 (quoting Jones, 463 U.S. at 746). In addition, counsel re-
tains the ability to make "reasonable professional judgments" by choosing not to pur-
sue a nonfrivolous issue on appeal. Id. (citing Jones, 463 U.S. at 754).
22. See supra notes 12, 17-19 (discussing Finley, Evitts, McCoy and Penson).
23. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 979, 920 P.2d at 731, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 (citing Mc-
Coy, 486 U.S. at 438-39 n.10).
24. Id. at 979-81, 920 P.2d at 731-33, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786-88.
25. 67 Cal 2d 444, 432 P.2d 21, 62 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
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Anders decision by holding that "[c]ounsel must prepare a brief to assist;
the court.... Counsel is not allowed to withdraw from the case until the
court is satisfied that he has discharged his duty to the court and his
client to set forth adequately the facts and issues involved."26 Feggans
also requires an appellate court to provide the appellant with new
counsel if any meritorious contention remains.27
Second, the court discussed People v. Wende." In Wende, the Califor-.
nia Supreme Court decided whether the court of appeal must indepen..
dently review the entire record prior to finding that an appeal lacked
merit.' The Wende court found that upon submission of an Anders
brief, an appellate court must conduct this review.' Furthermore, the
Wende court held that counsel is under no obligation to withdraw "if he
believes the appeal to lack any basis in law or fact" because counsel's
involvement will benefit both the court and the defendant."
2. Discussion
The majority of the court in Sade C. next turned to its primary discus.-
sion: whether it should extend Anders to "an indigent parent's appeal
from a judgment or order... adversely affecting his custody of a child
or his status as the child's parent."' The court advanced three reasons
why Anders should not be extended to juvenile court proceedings. First,
the court stated that Anders applied only in a criminal context.' By
contrast, juvenile court proceedings are civil in nature and therefore "far
26. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 979, 920 P.2d at 731, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 (quoting
Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d at 447-48, 432 P.2d at 23, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 421).
27. Id. at 980, 920 P.2d at 731, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 786 (citing Feggans, 67 Cal. 2d
at 447-48, 432 P.2d at 23, 62 Cal. Rptr. at 421).
28. 25 Cal. 3d 436, 600 P.2d 1071, 158 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1979).
29. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 980, 920 P.2d at 732, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787 (citing
Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 440, 600 P.2d at 1074, 158 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 842).
30. Id. (citing Wende, 25 Cal. 3d at 441-42, 600 P.2d at 1074-75, 158 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
842-43).
31. Id. at 980-81, 920 P.2d at 732-33, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787-88 (citing Wende, 25
Cal. 3d at 442, 600 P.2d at 1071, 158 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 839). This holding is distinct
from that of previous cases: the Penson Court stated that counsel may seek to with-
draw, the Anders Court contended that counsel should seek to withdraw, and the Mc-
Coy Court found that counsel had a duty to withdraw. See id. at 981 n.9, 920 P.2d at
732 n.9, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 787 n.9; see 3 B.E. WmuN, CAUFORNIA PROCEDURE, Attor-
neys § 77 (1985) (discussing ethical considerations regarding withdrawal by-an attor-
ney); Bruce A. Boyer, Ethical Issues in the Representation of Parents in Child Welfare
Cases, 64 FORDHAm L. REV. 1621 (1996) (discussing the ethical dilemmas facing attor-
neys who wish to withdraw from representation of parents in child abuse cases).
32. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 981-82, 920 P.2d at 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
33. Id. at 982, 920 P.2d at 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
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removed from the object of the Anders court's concern."4 Second, the
court stated that Anders is dependent upon the right to counsel at an
appellate proceeding.' Indigent parents at juvenile proceedings, howev-
er, do not possess this right." Finally, the court summarized by stating
that the right to counsel at a first appeal "does not exist for the indigent
parent adversely affected by a state-obtained decision on child custody
or parental status."3 7
The court next addressed three arguments in favor of extension of
Anders to the case at bar.'
a. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
First, the appellants contended that the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause compelled extension of Anders to an indigent parent's
appeal.' In deciding this issue, the court based its analysis on the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services." In Lassiter, the United States Supreme Court developed a
balancing test to evaluate a Fourteenth Amendment claim.4 The factors
involved included: (1) the private liberty interests of the parties; (2) the
government interest at stake; and (3) the "risk that the procedures used
will lead to erroneous decisions.
42
Applying the first of these three factors to the case at bar, the court
found that the "private interests at stake are those of the indigent parent
and his child."' The court reasoned that indigent parents have two pri-
mary interests.' First, they have an interest "in the care, custody, and
management of [their] child[ren]. "41 Second, they have an interest in
"the 'accuracy and justice' of the resolution of [their] appeal."' Children
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 983, 920 P.2d at 734, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789.
38. Id. at 984-93, 920 P.2d at 734-41, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 789-96.
39. Id. at 985, 920 P.2d at 735, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 790.
40. 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the appointment of counsel is not constitution-
ally required in every proceeding on parental status).
41. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 987, 920 P.2d at 736, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791 (citing
Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
42. Id. (citing Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
43. Id. at 987, 920 P.2d at 737, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
44. Id. at 987-88, 920 P.2d at 737, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
45. Id. at 987, 920 P.2d at 737, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792.
46. Id. at 987-88, 920 P.2d at 737, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792 (internal citations omitted)
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also have two recognized liberty interests." First, childred have an inter-
est "in a 'normal family home' with parents if possible[,] or at least in a
home that is 'stable.'"" Second, children have an interest "in an accurate
and just resolution of [their] parents' appeal."49 In reconciling these in-
terests, the court recognized that protecting the interest of the parent.
may harm that of the child because "[wihat the parent wants or needs is
not necessarily what the child wants or needs."" Therefore, it deter-
mined that the decision made by the lower court was accurate and
just.51
Turning to the second balancing test factor, the California Supreme
Court stated that the "parens patriae" interest in protecting the welfare
of the child fulfilled the government's interest factor as required by
Lassiter.' In addition, the state has an administrative interest in reduc-
ing the amount of time it takes to resolve an appeal, because "a 'period
of time' that 'may not seem.., long.., to an adult... can be a lifetime
to a young child.'"'
Finally, the court found that the third factor of the balancing test, the
risk of erroneous resolution of the appeal, was only "negligible" in the
instant case.' The court noted that the appointed counsel acts as a
faithful advocate on behalf of the defendant to ensure compliance with
procedural protections throughout the process.'
Therefore, the majority of the court found that the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause did not prohibit court exclusion of the
Anders procedures from an indigent parent's appeal.'
b. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause
The appellants' second argument was that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates similar treatment to all indigent;
(quoting Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27).
47. Id. at 988-89, 920 P.2d at 737-38, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792-93.
48. Id. at 988, 920 P.2d at 737, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 792 (internal citations omitted)
(quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982) and In re Marilyn H., 5 Cal. 4th
295, 306, 851 P.2d 826, 833, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 544, 551 (1993)).
49. Id at 988, 920 P.2d at 738, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793 (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at
754 n.7).
50. Id. at 989, 920 P.2d at 738, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
51. Id.
52. Id. (citing Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (1982)).
53. Id. at 990, 920 P.2d at 738-39, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793-94 (quoting Marilyn H., 5
Cal. 4th at 310, 851 P.2d at 835, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 553 (omissions in original)).
54. Id. at 990, 920 P.2d at 739, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 794.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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litigants, thus requiring that parents receive the protection granted to
criminal defendants under Anders." The California Supreme Court re-
jected this argument on the basis that "[c]riminal defendants and parents
are not similarly situated."' Criminal defendants are given certain
protections under the Constitution that parents are not, including the
right to counsel,' the right to confront their accusers, an increased bur-
den of proof, and the right to appellate counsel at the first appeal.' In
addition, criminals face punishment, whereas parents in juvenile court
proceedings do not.6'
c. State Policy
The court moved bn to address the third and final argument advanced
on behalf of the parents. 2 The appellants contended that the court
should extend Anders "as a matter of policy in the exercise of [the] in-
herent power to declare rules of California appellate procedure."' The
majority conducted a cost-benefit analysis and found that the costs of
adopting such a rule outweighed its benefits.' The costs included time,
money, and the undermining of the finality of lower court judgments.'
On the other hand, the only benefit was ensuring adequate representa-
tion, which the court described as "relatively small. "
Therefore, the California Supreme Court declined to extend Anders to
an indigent parent's appeal challenging a lower court's judgment as to
57. Id. at 991-92, 920 P.2d at 740, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
58. Id. at 991, 920 P.2d at 740, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
59. Although the U.S. Constitution guarantees only criminal defendants the right to
counsel, California provides this right in juvenile proceedings to both indigent juveniles
and parents. 27 CAL JuR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children §§ 62-67 (1987 &
Supp. 1996).
60. Sade C, 13 Cal. 4th at 991-92, 920 P.2d at 740, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795 (citing
U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, VIII, & XIV, § 1). Although not required to do so under the
U.S. Constitution, California provides the indigent parent with a right to representation
on appeal. 27 CAL JuR. 3D Delinquent and Dependent Children § 222 (1987 & Supp.
1996) (stating that indigent parent is entitled to representation on appeal); 10 B.E.
WrIN, SUMMARY OF CAUFORNIA LAW, Parent and Child § 640 (1989) (stating that there
is a right to counsel on appeal for both indigent child and parent).
61. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 991, 920 P.2d at 740, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
62. Id. at 992, 920 P.2d at 740, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 992-93, 920 P.2d at 740-41, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 795-96.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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child custody or termination of parental rights 7 and affirmed the deci-
sion of the lower court.68
B. Justice Kennard's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kennard dissented from the majority of the court in Sade C. for
two primary reasons.' First, she asserted that California statutory law
implicitly grants an indigent parent the right to counsel on appeal in a
juvenile court proceeding.' Furthermore, California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 317.5 requires appointed counsel to be competent."'
Justice Kennard contended that the court of appeal must follow the pro-
cedures outlined in Anders in order to ensure the competence of counsel
because "the affirmance of a juvenile court's judgment erroneously de-
priving a parent of the custody of the child... results in a loss to both
the parent and the child that can never be undone."'
Second, Justice Kennard dissented from the majority because every
state which has decided the applicability of Andem to juvenile court
proceedings has held that Anders has "equal force to cases involving
indigent parents appealing a juvenile court's decision."'
Therefore, Justice Kennard would have reversed the judgment of the
lower court and mandated compliance with Anders.74
III. IMPACT
The primary impact of the decision in Sade C. is the court's express
limitation of the applicability of Anders.7" Despite the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and rights under
California law,"6 the court narrowly construed the Anders decision,
thereby limiting protection to criminal defendants.77 In this respect, the
court followed the trend set by the United States Supreme Court in
67. id. at 993, 920 P.2d at 741, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796.
68. Id. at 994-95, 920 P.2d at 741-42, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 796-97.
69. Id. at 995-1000, 920 P.2d at 74245, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797-800 (Kennard, J., dis-
senting).
70. Id. at 998, 920 P.2d at 744, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 799 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 998, 920 P.2d at 745, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 999, 920 P.2d at 745, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 999-1000, 920 P.2d at 745, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 800 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
75. See id. at 982, 920 P.2d at 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
76. See supra notes 39-66 and accompanying text.
77. Sade C., 13 Cal. 4th at 982, 920 P.2d at 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
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F'inley. and Austin,' and declined to extend Anders to collateral ap-
peals and cases of discretionary review.
IV. CONCLUSION
Counsel seeking to withdraw from cases involving an appeal from a
judgment concerning child custody or the termination of parental rights
are no longer required to fie an Anders brief.' This leaves the indigent
parent with the responsibility of challenging the decision of the lower
court.8  In- order to do so, the appellant must "raise claims of reversible
error or other defect... and 'present argument and authority on each
point made.'"' If the parent raises no valid contentions, the appellate
court may order dismissal of the appeal.' Hence, the courts of appeal
did not err in the two cases involved in Sade C. by dismissing the claims
because both defendants failed to raise meritorious challenges to the
judgment rendered by the lower court."
MARISA CASTAGNET
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Rptr.
83.84.
See supra note 12.
See supra note 13.
Id. at 982, 920 P.2d at 733, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 788.
Id at 994, 920 P.2d at 742, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 797.
Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lackner, 97 Cal. App. 3d 576, 591, 159 Cal.
1, 9 (Ct. App. 1979)).
Id.
Id.
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VII. PUBLIC WELFARE AND UTILITIES
Causes of action for personal injury, trespass, nuisance,
inverse condemnation, negligence and violation of due
process rights in connection with alleged injuries caused
by electric and magnetic field (EMF) emissions fail
when they interfere with the regulatory commission's
policy on EMF emissions and public health and safety:
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court.
I. INTRODUCTION
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court,' the California
Supreme Court considered whether homeowners had a right to sue for
injuries sustained as a result of electric and magnetic field (EMF) emis-
sions from power lines above their property when a previously decided
case held that the regulatory commission, rather than the courts, has
exclusive jurisdiction over such matters.2 The trial court overruled the
defendant's demurrer which asserted that because the utility regulatory
commission had exclusive jurisdiction, the trial court lacked jurisdiction
over the complaint.' Addressing the merits of the plaintiffs' complaint,4
1. 13 Cal. 4th 893, 920 P.2d 669, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 724 (1996). Justice Mosk wrote
the majority opinion in which Chief Justice George and Justices Kennard, Baxter,
Werdegar, Chin, and Brown concurred. Id. at 893-951, 920 P.2d at 669-705, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 724-60.
2. Id. at 902-03, 920 P.2d at 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728. The plaintiffs, Martin and
Joyce Covalt, owned a home and property in San Clemente, California. Id. at 910, 920
P.2d at 678, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733. San Diego Gas & Electric Company (Electric
Company) owns an easement next to the plaintiffs' property, through which the com-
pany runs electricity via power lines. Id. at 910-11, 920 P.2d at 678, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
733. The plaintiffs claimed that the power lines "emitted unreasonably dangerous levels
of electromagnetic radiation" onto their property, and further, that the Electric Compa-
ny increased the number of power lines in 1990, resulting in higher levels of radiation.
Id. at 911, 920 P.2d at 678-79, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733-34. In 1993, the plaintiffs filed
suit against the Electric Company for personal injuries and property damage, demand-
ing relief in the form of money damages and an injunction prohibiting the Electric
Company from continuing to run electricity through the subject power lines. Id. at 912,
920 P.2d at 679, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734.
3. Id. at 912, 920 P.2d at 679-80, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 734-35. The defendant relied
on Public Utilities Code section 1759, which provides that "no court except [the] Su-
preme Court has jurisdiction to review any order or decision of the Public Utilities
Commission ... or to interfere with the commission in performance of its duties." Id.
at 902, 920 P.2d at 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728 (citing CAL PUB. UTIL CODE § 1759
(West 1994)). Public Utilities Code section 2016, which "authorizes an action in superl-
or court for damages caused by an unlawful act of a public utility," is in apparent
conflict with section 1759. Id. (citing CA PUB. UTI. CODE § 2016 (West 1994)). Fortu-
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the court of appeal held that the homeowners failed to show that they
suffered any physical personal injuries from the EMF emissions; thus,
their personal injury causes of action were meritless.5 Turning to the
allegations of property damage, the appellate court concluded that a
ruling for the plaintiffs on any of the property damage causes of action
would violate the rule set forth in Waters.' Consequently, the court of
appeal overturned the trial court's decision.7 The California Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeal and held that the plaintiffs' complaint
conflicted with the Public Utility Commission's policy on EMF emissions
and public health and safety.'
II. TREATMENT
The supreme court began its opinion with a lengthy discussion of the
scientific principles behind electric and magnetic fields.9 After a recita-
tion of the facts and procedural history of the case at bar,'" the supreme
nately, the supreme court previously decided the conflict at issue in Waters v. Pacific
Tel. Co., holding that section 2016 applies only to cases where the damages remedy
would not "hinder or frustrate the commission's declared supervisory and regulatory
policies." Id. at 902-03, 920 P.2d at 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728 (quoting Waters v.
Pacific Tel. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 523 P.2d 1161, 1162, 114 Cal. Rptr. 753, 754 (1974)).
4. Id. at 913-14, 920 P.2d at 680, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735. Although in general the
appellate court may not review the trial court's decision on a demurrer until the case
has been tried on the merits, there is an exception to the rule. Id. at 912-13, 920 P.2d
at 680, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735. Pursuant to this exception, which allows appellate
court review "when the demurrer raises an important question of subject-matter juris-
diction," the appellate court granted the Electric Company's writ. Id. at 913, 920 P.2d
at 680, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735.
5. Id. at 913-14, 920 P.2d at 680, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 735. The court noted that in
order to recover for the fear of cancer caused by the emissions, the plaintiffs must
prove, among other things, that a preponderance of the scientific and medical evidence
supports their fear. Id.
6. Id. at 914, 920 P.2d at 681, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736. See supra note 3, for an
explanation of the Waters rule.
7. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 914, 920 P.2d at 681, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 736.
8. Id. at 903, 920 P.2d at 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728.
9. Id. at 903-10, 920 P.2d at 673-78, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 728-33. Within this back-
ground discussion, the court emphasized two points. First, the way that electric power
grids work, and second, that EMFs are not just a product of power lines, but material-
ize from wired buildings, ground currents and household appliances. Id. at 908-10, 920
P.2d at 677-78, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 732-33.
10. Id. at 910-14, 920 P.2d at 678-81, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 733-36.
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court explained that both the state constitution and the legislature have
conferred broad powers and authority to the Utility Regulatory Commis-
sion." The court stated that the California Legislature, via the Public
Utilities Act (PUA), established the procedure for judicial review of a
commission decision.'2 Because section 1759 of the PUA, which pro-
vides that any judicial review of commission decisions is to be exclusive-
ly decided by the supreme court (bypassing the appellate court), con-
flicts with section 2016, which provides a private cause of action for
money damages, the supreme court was compelled to decide whether the
instant action could stand under existing case law. 3 The supreme court
reiterated that Waters resolved this conflict by holding that section 2016
allowed an action for damages only if it "would not hinder or frustrate
the commission's declared supervisory and regulatory policies."4
The court pronounced that the commission has the authority to de-
termine public health and safety risks, as well as prescribe a remedial
policy for those risks." In addition, the court declared that the commis-
sion has the power to decide where overhead electric lines, poles, and
wires sit.'" With the authority issue settled, the court turned to whether
the commission had adopted and implemented a policy on EMF emis-
sions and public welfare."
The court explained that in 1988 the commission along with the De-
partment of Health Services prepared a study to research whether the
risk of cancer from EMF emissions was unreasonable, and if so, what re-
11. Id. at 914-15, 920 P.2d at 681, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736. The court noted that
article XII, sections 1-6 of the California Constitution lists the regulatory commission's
powers, while the Public Utilities Act contains the legislature's declaration of commi.
sion authority. Id,
12. Id. at 915, 920 P.2d at 681-82, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736-37.
13. Id. at 916-17, 920 P.2d at 682, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737; see also supra note 3.
14. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 917-18, 920 P.2d at 683, 55 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 738 (quoting Waters v. Pacific Tel. Co., 12 Cal. 3d 1, 4, 523 P.2d 1161, 1162, 114
Cal. Rptr. 753, 754 (1974)). The court expressly noted that if there was no current
commission policy, then there would be no bar to an action for damages. Id. at 918,
920 P.2d at 683, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 739. The court proceeded to list various case ex-
amples where there was either no active commission policy, or the cause of action did
not conflict with an operative policy. Id. at 919-23, 920 P.2d at 684-87, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 739-42.
15. Id, at 923-24, 920 P.2d at 687, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742.
16. Id. at 924-25, 920 P.2d at 687-88, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 742-43. The court provided
a brief history regarding the development of this power. Id. Additionally, the court not-
ed that each utility "must obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity from
the commission before" constructing or upgrading any power line. Id. at 925, 920 P.2d
at 688, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743. Thus, the utilities are coordinated through a central
power source, the commission.
17. Id. at 926, 920 P.2d at 688, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743.
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medial measures they should take. 8 Unfortunately, the study was incon-
clusive, finding that although the health risk from EMF emissions was
troublesome, it was not yet substantial. 9 Thus, the commission decided
to take no further action regarding the cancer risk until there were more
concrete findings.'
Next, the court set forth the preliminary policy that the commission
developed to address the public fear of the unknown risks of EMF relat-
ed cancer."' The court listed the proposed terms of a regulatory policy
as follows: (1) avoid erecting new power lines; (2) if new lines are neces-
sary, put new commission restrictions on implementation of the lines; (3)
hold hearings on health and safety policies in connection with EMF emis-
sions; (4) take affirmative steps to reduce existing fields, be aware of the
potential problems when new lines are put up, and measure existing
fields at homes and offices; and (5) research and educate the public as to
the EMF emission related cancer issue.' The court then summarized an
official "Interim Policy" adopted by the commission to resolve the rele-
vant issues.' The policy terms included: (1) a decrease in emissions for
"new and upgraded facilities"; (2) acceptance of comments on ways to
treat existing facilities; (3) mitigation of the emissions by design modifi-
cations; (4) uniform utility policies and measurement plans (to educate
the public); (5) creation of an advisory committee to implement a policy
on education and research, funded by the utilities; (6) creation of coordi-
nated, centralized education on EMF emissions funded by the utilities;
and (7) creation of coordinated, centralized research on EMF emissions
funded by the utilities.24
Keeping this interim policy in mind, the court next examined whether
the plaintiffs' prayers for relief conflicted with the commission's imple-
mented policy on EMF enissions.25 With respect to the plaintiffs' claims
18. Id. at 926, 920 P.2d at 688-89, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 743-44.
19. Id. at 926, 920 P.2d at 689, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744.
20. Id. at 927, 920 P.2d at 689, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 744; see also James H. Stilwell,
Walking the High Wire: Practical Possibilities for Regulatory Responses to the Elec-
tromagnetic Field Quandary, 15 REv. LNG. 141 (1996) (discussing the Catch-22 faced
by regulatory commissions as well as possible solutions to the EMF dilemma).
21. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 928, 920 P.2d at 690, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 745.
22. Id. at 928-30, 920 P.2d at 690-92, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 745-47.
23. Id. at 930-33, 920 P.2d at 691-93, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747.
24. Id. at 931-34, 920 P.2d at 692-94, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 747-49.
25. Id. at 935, 920 P.2d at 694, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 749.
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of personal injury, the court rejected their cause of action because they
did not prove (as no one could) that EMF emissions cause cancer.2" To
the plaintiffs' allegations of trespass, specifically the assertion that the
Electric Company's emissions entered the plaintiffs' property without
their consent, the court replied that because emissions are intangible, the
proper cause of action is for nuisance, not trespass.27 Because the plain-
tiffs also alleged nuisance, the court declared that the plaintiffs must;
prove that "interference with [their] ... use and enjoyment of [the] prop.
erty" caused substantial actual damage and was unreasonable.2 The
court then held that the plaintiffs failed to show that their fear of cancer
had caused interference with their use and enjoyment of the property
because recovery for fear of cancer would conflict with the commission's
extensive study and policy finding that there was no reasonable harm
connected with EMF emissions.2
The court also found the plaintiffs' inverse condemnation allegation
meritless because they failed to prove the government took, damaged, or
invaded the property, "result[ing] in a burden on the property that [was]
direct, substantial, and peculiar to the property itself." 3 Finally, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' other sundry complaints by noting that: (1)
the legislature declared the commission's jurisdictional authority;3' (2)
26. Id.; see Nicholas Shannin, Convering Theories: An Analysis of the Future of
Medical Monitoring as a Remedy for the Victims of Powertine Radiation Torts, 7 U.
FLA. J.L & PUB. PoL'Y 127 (1995) (discussing the possibility of awarding medical morn-
toring costs as damages to EMF plaintiffs).
27. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 935-36, 920 P.2d at 695, 55 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 750. The court analogized the instant case to Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co., 32
Cal. 3d 229, 649 P.2d 922, 185 Cal. Rptr. 280 (1982), which involved another intangi-
ble-noise.
28. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 937-38, 920 P.2d at 696-97, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 751-52. The court defined the test for "unreasonableness" as whether the
harm to the plaintiff outweighed the social benefit of the defendant's conduct. Id. at
938, 920 P.2d at 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 752. For a general discussion of the remedies
available for a nuisance cause of action, 'see 47 CAL. JuR. 3D Nuisances §§ 57-59
(1994) (discussing injunctions, costs, and damages).
29. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 939, 920 P.2d at 697, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 752. But see 47 CAL. JUR. 3D Nuisances § 18 (1994) (stating "[t]he frightening ef-
fect ... and... mental distress caused to the plaintiff, may also be taken into con-
sideration"); 6 B.E. WrrKN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNLA LAw, Torts § 1472 (9th ed. 1988)
(noting the plaintiff may recover future damages).
30. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 939-43, 920 P.2d at 697-700, 55 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 752-55; see also 8 B.E. WinoN, SUMMARY OF CAiFORNiA LAw, Constitutional
Law § 1058 (9th ed. 1988) (distinguishing inverse condemnation from a simple tort
cause of action). For a general discussion of inverse condemnation, see Michael Rikon,
Inverse Condemnation, 67 N.Y. ST. B.J., Dec. 1995, at 28.
31. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 944, 920 P.2d at 700, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 755.
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the Waters rule is not to be read narrowly;2 (3) the scientific and medi-
cal community has not reached any consistent conclusions as to the
relationship between EMF emissions and cancer, 3 (4) the EMF policy is
as uniform as it can be;' (5) the plaintiffs' power lines, as upgraded in
1990, were "existing" when the interim policy was rendered in 1993;1
(6) there is no negligence cause of action because it would be unfair to
hold the utility liable for not doing what the policy did not require it to
do;' (7) the plaintiffs do not have a constitutional right to compensa-
tion because they failed to prove a "taking";37 (8) the plaintiffs did not
prove a due process violation as the policy was quasi-legislative, rather
than quasi-judicial;' and (9) the plaintiffs did not have a right to a jury
trial because in inverse condemnation cases that right is limited to the
damages issue, of which there was none.'
Ill. IMPACT
By emphasizing the Public Utility Commission's broad constitutional
and legislative powers, the supreme court reinforced a standard of "def-
erence to the regulatory commission."' Accordingly, San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. compels lower courts faced with similar regulatory commis-
sion issues to take a "hands off" approach.4' This conclusion is further
supported by the court's reaffirmation of the twenty-two year old Waters
holding, which also determined that the commission's policy controls.42
Additionally, the California Supreme Court foreclosed any possibility of
monetary recovery by the plaintiffs for personal injury or property dam-
age caused by EMF emissions.' In so doing, the court essdntially took
the position that there is no conclusive evidence supporting the notion
that EMF emissions cause cancer." Unfortunately, until the public per-
32. Id. at 944, 920 P.2d at 701, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 756.
33. Id. at 946, 920 P.2d at 702, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 757.
34. Id. at 949, 920 P.2d at 704, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
35. Id. at 950, 920 P.2d at 704, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 759.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 950, 920 P.2d at 705, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
38. Id. at 951, 920 P.2d at 705, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 760.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 914-15, 920 P.2d at 681-82, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 736.
41. See id.
42. Id. at 916-23, 920 P.2d at 682-87, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 737-42.
43. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
44. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 935, 920 P.2d at 694, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
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ception catches up to the court's view, property values of land in close
proximity to power lines will likely continue to fall, and the owners will
have no judicial recourse.'
IV. CONCLUSION
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co., the court examined the Public Utility
Commission's policy on EMF emissions and decided to defer to that
policy.4" Consequently, plaintiffs are barred from bringing causes of ac-
tion for personal injury, trespass, nuisance, inverse condemnation, negli-
gence, and violation of Constitutional Due Process based upon the ef-
fects of EMF emissions on personal property.47
PAMELA L. SCHLEHER
at 749.
45. See Andrew James Schutt, Comment, The Power Line Dilemma: Compensatiim
for Diminished Property Value Caused by Fear of Electromagnetic Fields, 24 FL. ST.
U. L REv. 125 (1996) (discussing fear as a factor in computing damages to property
value); James R. Arnold, The Value of Contaminated Property in The Impact of Envi-
ronmental Law on Real Estate and Other Commercial Transactions, 643, 646 (A.L.I.-
A.B.A. Course of Study, Oct. 12, 1995), available in WESTLAW, CA47 A.LI.-AB.A. 643
("science and law struggle to meet the demands of business and the public for cer-
tainty and specific dollar value for contamination's effects in the arena of public opin-
ion"); supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
46. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 13 Cal. 4th at 903, 920 P.2d at 673, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 728.
47. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
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SUMMARIES
I. Criminal Law
A. A criminal defendant may not challenge a prior
conviction on the ground of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel in the course of a current pros-
ecution for a noncapital offense.
Garcia v. Superior Court, Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia, Decided January 9, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 953,
928 P.2d 572, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 858.
Facts. After being charged with possession of heroin, the defendant filed
a motion to strike one of two prior serious convictions, arguing that the
conviction was constitutionally invalid because he had received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. The trial court determined that the defendant
was not entitled to raise a federal constitutional claim by way of a mo-
tion to strike, and further ruled that no state constitutional bases for his
claim existed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the defendant
was entitle to challenge a prior conviction regarding the effectiveness of
counsel.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that
under the Federal Constitution, a defendant is entitled to a hearing on
the effectiveness of counsel for prior convictions in a "capital" case. The
same protection is not afforded, however, in "noncapital" cases except
where the right to representation of counsel has been denied. The court
cited Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485 (1994), which held that under
federal sentencing statutes, criminal defendants may only challenge the
validity of prior convictions for violations of the right to representation
by counsel. Furthermore, the court reasoned that trial court efficiency
would be compromised by requiring evidentiary hearings for every claim
of ineffective counsel from prior convictions. Lastly, the court held that
nothing in the state constitution requires a trial court to provide an evi-
dentiary hearing in these cases.
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B. California Welfare and Institutions Code section
702 requires that in a juvenile adjudication,
where the defendant has committed a crime
which would be punishable in an adult proceed-
ing as either a misdemeanor or a felony, the
trial court must expressly state in the record
that the violation is a misdemeanor or felony.
In re Manzy, Supreme Court of California, Decided
February 20, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1199, 930 P.2d
1255, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 889.
Facts. The juvenile defendant was charged with and admitted guilt to
"joyriding" and possession of methamphetamine, a controlled substance..
The maximum penalties for joyriding and possession of a controlled
substance were one month and three years of jail time, respectively. The
possession of a controlled substance charge, however, was a "wobbler"
offense which gave the trial court the discretion to treat the crime as a
felony or misdemeanor. Although the probation department recommend-
ed that a sentence of sixty to seventy-five days be instituted, the juvenile
court ordered the defendant to serve the maximum sentence, three years
and one month in jail. The minor defendant appealed, alleging that the
trial court failed to adhere to California Welfare and Institutions Code
section 702, because the court failed to expressly state whether posses-
sion of the controlled substance was a felony or misdemeanor.
Holding. Affirming the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
court held that the trial court's failure to expressly state in the record
whether the drug possession offense was a felony or misdemeanor re-
quired that the case be remanded for a formal declaration, even though
the sentence indicated that the court decided it was a felony. Because of
the prejudicial effect of a felony conviction due to Proposition 8, which
states that any prior felony conviction can be used for impeachment
purposes in a criminal case, and the "three strikes law" which allows
sentence enhancement when the defendant has committed certain prior
felonies, it was important for the court to definitively express whether
the offense at issue was a felony or misdemeanor.
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C. Where a trial court has made a fact-specific
inquiry in its discretionary decision pursuant to
California Penal Code section 17(b) to reduce a
wobbler offense initially filed under the three
strikes law from a felony to a misdemeanor,
such exercise of authority is not an abuse of
discretion.
People v. Alvarez, Supreme Court of California,
Decided January 16, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 968, 928
P.2d 1171, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 93.
Facts. Upon discovery of drug paraphernalia, including a "baggie" con-
taining 0.41 grams of powdered methamphetamine, during a consensual
search, the defendant was charged with a felony violation of Health and
Safety Code section 11377, subdivision (a). The People further alleged
four prior serious felony convictions within the meaning of California
Penal Code sections 667 and 1170.12 (the "three strikes law"). During the
jury trial, the trial court took under submission the defendant's motion to
have the felony charge declared a misdemeanor under California Penal
Code section 17(b). After the jury returned a guilty verdict, the trial court
exercised its discretion at the sentencing hearing and reduced the
defendant's felony charge to a misdemeanor.
The People filed a petition for a writ of mandate to vacate the trial
court's reduction of the felony charge and its refusal to punish the de-
fendant as a recidivist under the three strikes law. The court of appeal
granted the petition and vacated the defendant's sentence, concluding
that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sufficiently consider
the defendant's criminal history and by substituting its views of proper
sentencing for those set forth by the legislature under the three strikes
law.
Holding. Reversing the decision of the court of appeal, the supreme
"court held that the trial court retains its broad authority under California
Penal Code section 17(b) to reduce "wobbler offenses," crimes that may
be sentenced alternately as felonies or misdemeanors, at the trial court's
discretion; under the three strikes law. The court stated that the legisla-
ture did not enact the three strikes law with an intent to supersede a
trial court's discretionary authority under section 17(b). The court further
1467
reasoned that before the three strikes law is triggered, the defendant,
must be convicted of a felony in the current proceeding. Once a trial
court determines that the nature of a defendant's current conviction is a
misdemeanor at a sentencing hearing, the offense becomes a misdemean-
or for all purposes and the three strikes law does not apply.
The court further held that the trial court's discretionary decision-mak-
ing under section 17(b) to reduce wobbler offenses initially filed under
the three strikes law is reviewable. The court found that "[t]he burden is
on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing
decision was irrational or arbitrary." The trial court is otherwise pre-
sumed to have sustained legitimate sentencing objectives, and the sen-.
tence will be upheld on review. The court noted that relevant factors
which the trial court should consider include the nature and circum.-
stances of the offense, the defendant's appreciation of and attitude to.-
ward the offense, his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and
demeanor at trial, and, when appropriate, general sentencing objectives
such as those set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 410. The court
also acknowledged the importance of public safety as a factor and noted
that the defendant's criminal history should. be considered. The court
resolved, however, that public safety considerations do not create a pre-
sumption against reducing wobbler offenses in three strikes cases. Final-
ly, the court noted that an intense factual inquiry is essential to the trial
court's exercise of authority pursuant to section 17(b), and such inquiry
must be reflected on the record.
The supreme court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion under section 17(b) by balancing the nature of the offense, the
defendant's criminal history, and the fact that the offense was charged
under the three strikes law, in its decision to reduce the defendant's
felony charge. Therefore, the court held that the reduction of the recidi-
vist defendant's felony drug possession conviction to a misdemeanor was
warranted.
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D. Transferred intent can be used to satisfy the
intent element for more than one crime, thus,
allowing the defendant to be found guilty of
murder of the unintended victim and attempted
murder of the intended victim.
People v. Scott, Supreme Court of Calfornia, De-
cided December 19, 1996, 14 Cal. 4th 544, 927 P.2d
288, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178.
Facts. In May 1991, the defendant and an accomplice drove to a park
and opened gunfire upon Calvin Hughes (Hughes). Hughes escaped with-
out harm, but Gary Tripp (Tripp) was shot in the leg and buttocks, and
Jack Gibson (Gibson) was killed when a bullet struck him in the head.
The defendant was charged with the murder of Gibson, the attempted
murders of Hughes and Tripp, and assault with a firearm on Hughes,
Tripp, and two others. Further, as to each count, a firearm enhancement
was alleged. The first trial resulted in a deadlocked jury. In the second
trial, the jury instruction on transferred intent provided that the
defendant's intent to kill Hughes could be transferred to Gibson. The
defendant was convicted of second degree murder, two counts of at-
tempted murder, and two counts of assault with a firearm. The court of
appeal modified and affirmed the conviction, rejecting the defendant's
argument that the transferred intent instruction should not have been
given since the defendant was charged with first degree murder of the
unintended victim and attempted murder of the intended victim. The
California Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.
Holding. The supreme court held that the trial court did not err by giv-
ing a transferred intent jury instruction. In affirming the decision of the
court of appeal, the court noted that intent is not "used up" once it satis-
fies an element of one charge. The court further rejected the defendant's
contention that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on transferred
intent for use of a firearm because the issue was not timely on appeal.
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II. Fraud and Deceit
When a person writes a letter of recommendation, that per-
son owes a duty of due care to third persons to not misrep-
resent facts regarding an individual's qualifications or char-
acter if such misrepresentations could reasonably and
foreseeably cause physical injury to a third person.
Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified School District, Supreme Court
of California, Decided January 27, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1066, 929
P.2d 582, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263.
Facts. The defendants were school district officers who wrote letters-of
recommendation to a college placement service, recommending Robert
Gadams (Gadams), a former administrative employee, for a teaching
position in another school district. According to the plaintiff's allegations,
the defendants had knowledge of prior complaints of sexual misconduct
against Gadams, but recommended him "unreservedly," failing to disclose
any such impropriety. As a result of the letters of recommendation, an-
other school district hired Gadams as a teacher. The plaintiff, a student
in the hiring school district, stated that she had been sexually assaulted
by Gadams. The plaintiff charged the defendants with general negligence,
negligent hiring, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, negligence per se,
and a Title IX sexual harassment violation. The defendants demurred as
a matter of law, arguing that in each cause of action, the plaintiff failed
to establish the element of a duty of due care owed to third parties. The
trial court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint on all grounds. The court of
appeal reversed the trial court's judgment on three counts: negligent
misrepresentation, fraud, and negligence per se. The court of appeal
based its reversal of the negligent misrepresentation and fraud counts,
referring to the Restatement Second of Torts, §§ 310-311, which impose
"liability on one who intentionally or negligently gives false information
to another person that results in physical injury to the recipient or a
third person." The court of appeal also reversed the trial court on the
negligence per se count, stating that the district owed a duty to the plain-
tiff to report charges of sexual misconduct to the authorities under the
Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. The California Supreme Court
reviewed the decision, a case of first impression before the court.
Holding. The court began by stating a general rule of law: "all persons
have a duty to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as
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the result of their conduct." The court next determined that the plaintiffs
injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the defendants, who could have
taken alternative courses of conduct to evade such harm. Considering
these factors, and a strong public policy in safeguarding minors from
sexual and physical abuse, the court held that when a person writes a
letter of recommendation, that writer owes a duty of due care to third
persons to not misrepresent facts regarding a person's qualifications or
character if such a misrepresentation could reasonably and foreseeably
cause a physical injury to the third person.
Applying the new law to the facts, the court determined that the trial
court improperly sustained the defendant's demurrers regarding the alle-
gations of negligent misrepresentation and fraud. The court reasoned that
the defendants owed a duty to the plaintiff, and their undeserved recom-
mendation of him was deceptively false and misleading if the defendants
had knowledge of Gadams' repeated sexual assaults. Further, the court
explained that the plaintiff was not required to have relied personally on
the letters of recommendation. Rather, the plaintiff was merely required
to allege that a physical injury resulted from the school district's reliance
on the misrepresentation.
However, the supreme court reversed the court of appeal's decision
regarding the negligence per se allegation, finding that the defendants did
not owe a duty to the plaintiff to report any incidents of child abuse
because the plaintiff was not a member of the intended class to be pro-
tected by the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act.
III. Insurance
California Public Utilities Code section 24361, the
provision of California's version of the Uniform Air-
craft Financial Responsibility Act (CUAFRA) that
prohibits the cancellation of any aircraft liability
insurance policy meeting the requirements of
CUAFRA unless thirty days prior notice is given to
the Department of Transportation, applies only to
policies that have been filed with the Department of
Transportation after an accident in satisfaction of
CUAFRA's financial responsibility requirements.
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Escobedo v. Estate of Snider, Supreme Court of Califor-
nia, Decided February 20, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 1214, 930
P.2d 979, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 722.
Facts. On October 30, 1992, Danny Snider (Snider) and Jennie Escobedo
(Escobedo) were killed in the crash of a Piper aircraft. Snider was the
owner and operator of the aircraft and Escobedo was his non-paying
passenger. The plaintiff, Escobedo's mother, filed a wrongful death ac-
tion against Snider's estate, but pursuant to the Probate Code, was limit-
ed in recovery to the amount of insurance coverage, if any. On Septem-
ber 12, 1992, Snider's insurer informed Snider that his liability policy
would be canceled if an additional payment was not received by October
12, 1992. On October 12, the insurer informed Snider that his policy
would be canceled for nonpayment of the premium, but that the policy
could be reinstated with no lapse in coverage if payment was received by
October 27, 1992. Snider never paid the premium.
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon its find-
ing that there was no coverage at the time of the accident due to the
expiration of the policy on October 12. The court of appeal reversed on
the grounds that CUAFRA required the insurer to send a cancellation
notice to the Department of Aeronautics before effecting cancellation.
Absent such notification, the court of appeal held that the policy could
not have expired on October 12. The supreme court granted review to
decide whether section 24361 of the California Public Utilities Code gov-
erns cancellation of all aircraft liability policies meeting certain coverage
minima, or only those policies filed with the department after an acci-
dent to satisfy the financial responsibility requirement.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court held that;
section 24361 applies only to cancellation of insurance policies that have,
before cancellation, been proffered to the department to show financial
responsibility after an accident.
In the instant case, the court concluded that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the policy at issue fell within the class of policies subject to
section 24361. After determining that the language of section 24361 and
its purpose within CUAFRA were ambiguous, the court stated that it
chose an interpretation that will result in extending fewer policies' cover-
age beyond the time of their facial cancellation, and avoiding the imposi.-
tion of a clerical burden of dubious value under CUAFRA on aviators,
insurers, and the department.
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IV. Torts
To the extent that it protects tobacco companies from di-
rect liability for harm caused by smoking, California Civil
Code section 1714.45 also precludes the allocation of pro-
portionate fault to absent tobacco companies in order to
reduce non-economic damages payable under Proposition
51.
Richards v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., Supreme Court of California,
Decided January 23, 1997, 14 Cal. 4th 985, 928 P.2d 1181, 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 103.
Facts. The plaintiff, a shipyard worker for forty-four years who was ex-
posed to uncontained insulation, filed suit against the defendant, an as-
bestos manufacturer, alleging negligence, strict liability for a defective
product, and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from his asbestos exposure. At trial, the defendant introduced
evidence that the plaintiff had smoked one to two packs of cigarettes per
day over the course of forty-three years, resulting in his affliction with
obstructive airway disease, a condition likely to exacerbate asbestosis.
Pursuant to Solano County Superior Court procedures for asbestos liti-
gation, the trial was tried in two parts. First, the jury was to determine
whether the plaintiffs exposure to asbestos was a proximate cause of his
injury, and determine the total amount of his damages. Second, the judge
issued a burden-shifting instruction to the jury instructing that the plain-
tiff had met his burden and should prevail unless the defendant could
adduce proof that its product was not a legal cause of the plaintiffs
injury. Following the first phase, the jury found in favor of the plaintiff,
awarding $5000 for economic damages and $275,000 for non-economic
damages. Prior to the second phase, the defendant sought permission to
establish that, in addition to the plaintiffs own fault for smoking and the
fault of the defendant and other asbestos manufacturers, cigarette manu-
facturers were at fault for supplying the harmful tobacco. If allowed,
pursuant to Proposition 51, the defendant could have reduced its amount
of liability for non-economic damages by the amount attributable to the
tobacco companies. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs objec-
tion on the grounds that California law does not consider tobacco com-
panies to be at fault for smoking-related illness. Therefore, tobacco com-
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panies are not within the "universe of tortfeasors" among which liability
can be apportioned. The court instructed the jury to only apportion fault
between the plaintiff, the defendant, and other asbestos manufacturers
and employers. The jury apportioned 2.5 percent fault to the plaintiff, I
percent to the defendant, and 96.5 percent to other entities.
The defendant appealed, citing as error the denial of the tobacco com-
pany defense and the burden-shifting instruction. The court of appeal
reversed, relying on DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 2 Cal. 4th 593, 828 P.2d
140, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 238 (1992). The court interpreted DaFonte as holding
that apportionment of non-economic damages under Proposition 51 must
include the "universe of tortfeasors," even those who are immune from
suit. The court also ruled that if a retrial occurred, the burden-shifting
instruction should not be given.
Holding. Reversing the court of appeal, the supreme court reconciled
DaFonte, Proposition 51, and California Civil Code section 1714.45. Prop-
osition 51 eliminated joint and several liability in certain cases, and lim-
ited a defendant's liability for non-economic damages to the amount
directly proportionate to his percentage of fault. The DaFonte court held
that a party may be at fault for purposes of apportionment but immune
for purposes of liability. This court noted, however, that section 1714.45,
a near verbatim codification of comment i of section 402A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, provides that a manufacturer shall not be liable
for injury or death caused by a product which is "inherently unsafe" and
is known to be so by the ordinary consumer, and is a common consumer
product intended for personal consumption, such as tobacco. The court
concluded that because tobacco suppliers are immune from direct liabili-
ty because they are simply not at fault, there is no fault to be appor-
tioned to them indirectly under Proposition 51.
The court remanded on the issue of the burden-shifting instruction to
determine if it alone warranted a new trial. The court cautioned that it
was also considering the instruction in a pending appeal of a companion
judgment, and nothing in the instant case should preclude the court of
appeal from applying a subsequent ruling.
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